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INTRODUCTION
In 1996, the Member States of the European Union will engage
in an inter-governmental conference to shape the further devel-
opment of the European Union. This conference was envisaged
in accordance with the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty on
European Union1 (TEU) of February 7, 1992, which itself
marked a significant stage in the progress towards European
unity, but recognised that further steps were necessary to
t This article is based on the the Eighth Annual Blaine Sloan lecture deliv-
ered by the author at the Pace University School of Law on September 21, 1994.
Presented in honor of Blaine Sloan, Professor Emeritus of International Law at
Pace University, the lecture series is delivered each year to the University and
Law School Community in order to promote scholarly debate in international law.
* Professor of European Law and Director of the Centre for the Law of the
European Union, University College, London; Professor, College of Europe, Bruges
and Visiting Professor, University of Siena. Of Counsel, Coudert Brothers. I am
grateful to the members of my European Union Law class at the Pace London Law
Program in Spring 1994, held at University College London, and in particular to
John Sarcone and Richard Chryss, with whom I discussed many of the issues ana-
lyzed here.
I MAATRICHT TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247
[hereinafter TEU].
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achieve that aim.2 Amongst the issues to be debated will be
questions concerning the time-table for European Economic and
Monetary Union3 (EMU), further political integration and the
creation of a European Political Union (EPU), a strengthened
common foreign and security policy, and increased power or
competence for the Union in areas such as immigration, police
affairs and asylum. These discussions will be conducted against
the background of a wider debate on the desirability of "broad-
ening and deepening" the Union. These jargon words raise
two complex issues: first, the question of broadening the Union,
that is, increasing the membership to include new Member
States, and second, that of deepening Union/Community pow-
ers, that is, transferring competence from the Member States to
the Union/Community in different areas of substantive law-
making.
This article first sketches the constitutional development of
the Community, leading to the formation of the European
Union. 4 Thereafter, it will discuss the challenges facing the
Union in the years to come.
FROM THE FOUNDING TREATIES TO THE AGREEMENT ON THE
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AREA
Following the devastation caused by World War II, a move-
ment gained force in Europe with the aim of promoting closer
European unity. Guided by visionaries such as Jean Monnet,
and by statesmen of the caliber of Adenauer, de Gasperi, Schu-
man,5 Spaak and others, this led first to the establishment,
under the Treaty of Paris of April 18, 1951, of the European
Coal and Steel Community6 (ECSC), set up by Germany,
France, Italy, The Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. The
2 Id. art. N(2).
3 See generally, RicHARD CORBETT, THE TREATY OF MAASTRICHT FROM CON-
CEPTION TO RATIFICATION: A COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE GUIDE (1993).
4 See generally, D.A.O. Edward, Nations, States, People & Commerce, John
Napier Memorial Lecture, Napier University, (Nov. 3, 1992).
5 See generally, GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EuRo-
PEAN COMMUNITY LAw 5 (1993) [hereinafter BEREANN] (for a brief history and dis-
cussion of Jean Monnet, the great French proponent of European integration, and
Robert Schuman, France's Foreign Minister).
6 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY, Apr.
18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter ECSC]
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importance of the ECSC should not be minimised: it showed
that previous irreconcilable enemies could work together with a
common aim in a close supranational context. The ECSC also
provided a model for future steps towards European unity.
The European Economic Community (EEC) came into be-
ing following the ratification of the Treaty of Rome of March 25,
19577 by the same six States which had established the ECSC.
Whereas the aim of the ECSC had been to create a single mar-
ket in coal and steel and place these materials under the control
of a supranational authority, the aims of the EEC were wider.
Although as its name would indicate, it was ostensibly an eco-
nomic Community, in fact its goals were more ambitious. In
wording clearly inspired by the American federal experience,
the founding Member States stated in the Preamble to the EEC
Treaty that they were "determined to lay the foundations of an
ever closer union among the peoples of Europe."8 Indeed it was
clear that the technique chosen by the Treaty-makers, following
failed attempts in the 1950's to create the over-ambitious Euro-
pean Defense Community and the European Political Commu-
nity, was to proceed slowly, using economic integration as the
vehicle to arrive at political integration.
The EEC Treaty9 provided for four Institutions: the Assem-
bly (later to be called the European Parliament), the Council of
Ministers, the Commission and the Court of Justice. The EEC
Treaty provided for the establishment of a common market,
based on four fundamental freedoms, the free movement of per-
sons, goods, capital and services, flanked by common policies in
fields such as foreign trade, agriculture, transport, competition,
and social matters, and with Community powers as regards the
harmonisation of the laws of the Member States to achieve the
aims of the Treaty.
The great absentee from these organisations was the
United Kingdom, which had been invited to participate in the
negotiations preceding the EEC Treaty but decided to adhere to
the Community. The reactions to the creation of the EEC pro-
vided the political momentum necessary to create an alterna-
7 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, Mar. 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC].
8 See Id. preamble.
9 See Id. art. 4.
19951
3
PACE INT'L L. REV.
tive trade bloc. On January 4, 1960, the European Free Trade
Association' o (EFTA) was signed in Stockholm by the United
Kingdom, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Austria, Switzerland
and Portugal. Finland, Iceland, and Liechtenstein subse-
quently adhered. In 1973, the United Kingdom and Denmark
acceded to the Community, and in 1986, Portugal. As will be
mentioned below, most of the remaining members of EFTA are
currently in the process of acceding to the European Union.
Ireland acceded to the Community in 1973, together with
the United Kingdom and Denmark. In 1979, Greece, and in
1986, Spain, as well as Portugal joined the Community, bring-
ing the total number of members to 12.
The early experience of the EEC was marked by difficulties,
largely as a result of Member State insistence on not being out-
voted at Council of Ministers level. In 1966, the French Govern-
ment adopted an "empty-seat" policy, consisting of not sending
representatives to Community meetings: this led to the conclu-
sion of the so-called Luxembourg Compromise 1 whereby effec-
tively a Member State was allowed to invoke "very important"
national interests in order to prevent the adoption of Commu-
nity legislation. Although not provided for in the Compromise,
this effectively gave Member States a veto power over Commu-
nity legislation. The Compromise successfully deprived the
Community Institutions, and especially the Commission, of
much of their self-confidence and momentum.
In these circumstances, the role of engine of integration fell
increasingly to the Court of Justice. Whereas some effective
progress was made in this period towards achieving the aims of
the Community, the completion of the common market made fit-
ful progress. 12 Some fifteen years of Euro-sclerosis and Euro-
pessimism passed before concrete steps were taken to renew
faith in Europe as an ideal.
10 CONVENTION ESTABLISHING THE EuRoPEAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION, Jan.
4, 1960, 370 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter EFTA].
11 NIGEL FOSTER, BLACKSTONE'S EC LEGISLATION 146 (1993) citing Bull. EC 3-
1966 point 9.
12 In this period, the working and accountability of the Institutions was im-
proved, some steps were taken to promote political and monetary co-operation in-
cluding the creation of the European Monetary System, there was budgetary
reform, the development of the European Council and direct elections to the Euro-
pean Parliament.
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In 1981, the Genscher-Colombo plan, symbolically and ap-
propriately emanating from the two European defeated Axis
powers, called for the progressive transformation of the Com-
munity into a new entity to be called a "European Union."13
This had its follow-up in the Solemn Declaration on European
Union, concluded at Stuttgart on June 19, 1983, to which all the
Member States subscribed. 14 In 1984, the European Parlia-
ment adopted a draft Treaty on European Union,' 5 product of
the vision of Altiero Spinelli.16 Nevertheless, it seemed almost
impossible that the idealism of the few could be translated into
political reality, but the decision of the European Council (com-
posed of the President of France and the Heads of Government
of all the Member States) of June 25-26, 1984 (the Fontaine-
bleau Summit) to set up the Dooge Committee (modelled on the
Spaak Committee responsible for the process which led to the
signature of the EEC Treaty) on European co-operation in both
the Community field and that of political, or any other, co-oper-
ation marked a decisive political step which led to the quicken-
ing of the tempo of European integration. At the same time, the
European Council also set up the Addonino Committee on a
People's Europe. The subsequent reports'7 were presented to
the Milan Summit on June 28-29, 1985 as was a White Paper
produced by Lord Cockfield, the Commissioner with responsibil-
ity for the internal market, which identified the remaining bar-
riers to trade within the Community and proposed a timetable
for their elimination by the end of 1992.18 The European Coun-
cil decided to convene a conference within the meaning of Arti-
cle 236 of the EEC Treaty' 9 for the purpose of amending the
EEC Treaty to take account of both the Dooge Committee rec-
ommendations and the White Paper.
13 See Pauline Neville-Jones, The Genscher /Colombo Proposals on European
Union, 20 COMMON MKT L. REV. 685 app. (1983).
14 Bull. EC 6-1983, point 1.6.1.
15 1976 O.J. (L 278) 1.
16 See THE EUROPEAN UNION TREATy (Capotorti et al. eds., 1986).
17 Dooge Committee Report, Bull. EC 3-1985, point 3.5.1.; Addonino Commit-
tee Report, Bull. EC supp. 7/85 (1985).
18 Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the
European Council, COM (85) 310 final.
19 EEC, supra note 7, art. 236.
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The outcome of the conference was the Single European
Act2° (SEA), signed on February 17, 1986 (by nine Member
States excluding Ireland, Denmark and Greece) and February
28, 1986 (by Ireland, Denmark and Greece).
The SEA gave renewed vitality to the Community. It is no
accident that it came at a time of economic dynamism: as Presi-
dent Delors has remarked, the Community draws its dynamism
from the economy.21 It attempted to remedy the stasis which
had been created in Community legislation by providing for
qualified majority voting in many areas, though for sensitive ar-
eas, unanimity was still required. It strengthened the powers
of the European Parliament (which has been directly elected by
the people of Europe since 1979)22 by providing for a coopera-
tion procedure23 whereby the Parliament was more involved in
Community legislation, though the last word still remained
with the non-elected Council of Ministers, representing the
Member States. It provided for cooperation between the Mem-
ber States in foreign policy, recognising a practice of coopera-
tion which had grown up in preceding years. Most importantly,
however, the SEA provided, by inserting a new Article 8a of the
EEC Treaty that:
[t]he Community shall adopt measures with the aim of progres-
sively establishing the internal market over a period expiring on
31 December 1992 .... The internal market shall comprise an
area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of
goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with
the provisions of this Treaty.24
Implicitly, the SEA is a recognition that the original EEC
Treaty provisions on establishing the common market had not
been realised. The new move towards the internal market must
be seen however in its political context: in the Preamble to the
Single European Act, the Member States declare that they are
20 Single European Act, 1986 O.J. (L169) 1 (hereinafter SEA].
21 Address to the European Parliament on the Occasion of the Investiture De-
bate of the New Commission, Feb. 10, 1993, Bull. EC supp. 1/93, point 9.
22 Act Concerning the Election of Representatives of the European Parliament
by Direct Universal Suffrage, 1976 O.J. (L 278) 1.
23 EEC, supra note 7, art. 149 repealed by the TEU.
24 EEC, supra note 7, art 8a added by art. 13 of the SEA; Now art. 7a EC, as
amended by the TEU.
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[m]oved by the will to continue the work undertaken on the basis
of the Treaties establishing the European Communities and to
transform relations as a whole among their States into a Euro-
pean Union, in accordance with the Solemn Declaration of Stutt-
gart of 19 June 1993.25
The aim of the treaty-makers thus remains unchanged: the aim
of the Community is political union, with economic convergence
and integration being used as the vehicle to achieve that polit-
ical union.
Since the signature of the Single European Act, the speed
of integration within the Communities increased, goaded by the
(legally uncertain) deadline of December 31, 1992,26 but the
Community took on a new significance vis-&-vis the rest of the
world. The Euro-pessimism mentioned above was replaced,
briefly, by Euro-euphoria, and has since stabilised at a more re-
alistic pitch.
In addition, a series of momentous events which may genu-
inely be characterised as epochal milestones took place in rapid
succession and the Community had to respond to these great
historical changes. The fall of the Berlin Wall, German integra-
tion and the dismantlement of the CMEA posed enormous chal-
lenges to the Community. However, with a renewed confidence
born of the success of the SEA, and with a confidence in the
Community as an organisation which had often seemed lacking
before, the Member States showed a political will and a speed of
reaction which was slightly surprising. Thus, German unifica-
tion was quickly accepted, and the five East.German Lander be-
came part of the Federal Republic of Germany, and thus part of
the Community. Agreements were speedily concluded with the
Central and East European countries formerly in the Soviet
bloc.
At the same time, the Community was also developing
closer relations with the EFTA countries.27 Previously, the
EFTA countries had bilateral Free Trade Agreements with the
25 Single European Act, 1986 O.J. (L 169) 1.
26 See A.G. Toth, The Legal Status of the Declarations attached to the Single
European Act, 23 COMMON MKT L. REV. 803 (1986); Compare H.G. Schermers, The
Effect of the Date 31 December 1992, 28 COMMON MKT L. REV. 275 (1991).
27 See generally, CREATING A EUROPEAN ECONOMIC SPACE: LEGAL ASPECTS OF
EC-EFTA RELATIONS (Mary Robinson and Jantien Findlater eds., 1990); WIDENING
THE COMMUNITY CIRCLE (Clive Church ed., 1990). See also the special number of
1995]
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EEC, 28 which they entered into in 1972, as the United Kingdom
and Denmark, two of its founding members were planning to
accede to the three European Communities. The Agreements
did not provide for any judicial system for the resolution of dis-
putes. Cooperation with the Community was first on a bilateral
level, and subsequently, after the completion of the free trade
area in 1984, increasingly on a multilateral level. Relations
were largely on the commercial level, in recognition of EFTA's
role as a trade organisation (it acquired a political dimension in
the 1980's).29 However, even in the trade agreements, there
was a stated readiness to develop closer links in line with in-
creased integration within the Community.30
The first EC-EFTA ministerial meeting, attended by the
Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the EC and EFTA countries and
the EC Commission, was held in Luxembourg on April 9, 1984,
and ended with the so-called Luxembourg Declaration which
called for increased cooperation between the two blocs. The Dec-
laration contained the first reference to the notion of a Euro-
pean Economic Space or Area.3 1
the Journal of Common Market Studies (XXVIII/4, June 1990) on the European
Community, EFTA and the new Europe.
28 Such agreements were concluded by Austria, Portugal, Sweden, Switzer-
land, Finland, Norway and Iceland. See Ulf Bernitz, The EEC-EFTA Free Trade
Agreements with Special reference to the Position of Sweden and the Other Scandi-
navian EFTA Countries, 23 COMMON MiT. L. REv. 567 (1986).
29 Jon Baldvin Hannibalsson, Introduction to CREATING A EUROPEAN Eco-
NOMIC SPACE: LEGAL ASPECTS of EC-EFTA Relations (Mary Robinson and Jantien
Findlater eds., 1990).
80 Jerome Lugon, The EFTA Relationship to the Community Circle, in WIDEN-
ING THE COMMUNITY CmCLE 18, 21 (Church ed., 1990).
31 The Declaration called for pragmatic and flexible cooperation beyond the
free trade agreements, as a natural extension of trade relations. The subjects en-
visaged as the subjects of such cooperation went far beyond trade, and included
research and development, social protection, working conditions and education, as
well as agriculture, fisheries, transport, energy, the environment, tourism and in-
tellectual property. Some twenty or more expert groups were formally constituted
as part of the process of discussion, consultation and cooperation within the frame-
work of the Luxembourg Declaration, in addition to regular high-level meetings of
high officials from the EFTA countries and the Commission. There were also more
informal consultations as well as a "vast number of informal contacts." No institu-
tional structure or legal framework was created for the cooperation within the con-
text of the Luxembourg Declaration. The agreements which ensued were for the
most part bilateral, and the result of an ad hoc rather than a structured and sys-
tematic approach. The EC and EFTA countries also entered into the Lugano Con-
vention, 1988 O.J. (L 319) 9, based on the Brussels Convention, and which itself
[Vol. 7:1
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A new more political relationship between the Community
and the EFTA was suggested by President Delors in a speech to
the European Parliament on January 17, 1989, in which he pro-
posed that the EFTA countries should enter into a new form of
partnership with the Community, with common decision-mak-
ing and administrative institutions. The Delors proposal came
at a time when the EFTA countries themselves were consider-
ing new ways of multilateral cooperation with the Community.
There were growing doubts within these countries as to
whether the pragmatic ad hoc cooperation started by the Lux-
embourg Declaration would be sufficient in order to enable
them to keep pace with the increased dynamism of the Commu-
nity's internal market programme.3 2 It was apparent that a
more comprehensive and ambitious approach than that offered
by the network of free trade and other bilateral agreements on
the one hand, and the cooperation resulting from the Luxem-
bourg Declaration on the other, was needed.
The Delors proposal was informed by three concerns. First,
it recognised the need for a wider EC-EFTA cooperation. This
called for a new approach as there needed to be a coordination
of the different fields of cooperation between the two blocs, since
a compartmentalised approach could lead to fragmentation.
Second, the EEA suggested by President Delors was in-
tended to be an alternative, at least initially, to accession. The
Commission, subsequently supported by the Council, had al-
ready taken the view in April 1988 that new accessions before
1993 should be ruled out, and that negotiations should not be
started before that date. The EEA was thus a means of deepen-
ing the EC-EFTA relationship without implying accession. It
should also be remembered that at the time of the Delors propo-
sal, no EFTA country had applied for accession, and the current
interest of the EFTA countries in acceding to the Community,
discussed below, was not foreseeable with certainty in most
cases (except that of Austria) at the time.
Third, even during the period when EFTA countries, which
were potential applicants for accession, were excluded by the
served as the basis for the San Sebastian Convention, 1989 O.J. (L 285) 1; as a
result of these conventions, the EC and EFTA countries created a European frame-
work for jurisdiction and enforcement in civil and commercial matters.
32 Hannibasson, supra note 29, at 3.
1995]
9
PACE INT'L L. REV.
position of principle taken by the Commission and Council, just
referred to, and which, given the length of accession negotia-
tions could last well into the mid-1990's, the creation of the EEA
would permit the extension of the single market to the EFTA
countries and significantly enhance the benefits offered by that
market.
The creation of a homogeneous market between 19 coun-
tries was at the heart of the Delors proposal and it was cer-
tainly this aspect which spurred EFTA interest in creating an
institutional structure for closer relations with the Community.
In 1990, 58% of EFTA exports were to the Community.33 The
EEA market comprises some 380 million consumers, accounts
for more than 46% of world trade,34 and 30% of world produc-
tion.35 Although the benefit is greater for the EFTA countries
than for the EC Member States,36 the EFTA consumers repre-
sent one of the most affluent markets in the world, with an av-
erage purchasing power one third higher than in the EC.
3 7
The Delors proposal met with a favourable reaction both
from the Oslo summit of the EFTA countries in March 1989,
and from the Foreign Affairs Council, meeting a week later in
Brussels. On June 18, 1990, the EC Council of Foreign Minis-
ters approved the recommendation for a Council Decision sub-
mitted by the Commission in May 1990 following pre-
negotiations with the EFTA countries authorising the Commis-
sion to negotiate, on behalf of the Community, an agreement
with the EFTA countries "speaking with a single voice" on the
creation of the EEA. Negotiations started officially on July 1,
1990. Agreement was reached on October 22, 1991, but the
agreement was not initialled.38 Renegotiations followed as in
Opinion 1/91, the European Court of Justice held that the draft
33 Charles LeadBeater, European Economic Treaty; Politicians Follow Where
Business has been Forced to Tread, THE FINANCIAL TIMES, Oct. 23, 1991, at 3.
34 Id. The EEA market accounted for 47.2% of total exports and 46.4% of im-
ports. Id.
35 Id.
36 Lest a Fortress Arise, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 26, 1991, at 81.
37 Lugon, supra note 30, at 25.
38 Initialling was planned for 18 November 1991. Oddly, the Community had
intended to go ahead with the initialling despite its request for an Opinion, even
though the Court had not given its ruling. However, when the Court asked ques-
tions of the Commission, the Council and the Member States, and announced that
it would not hold an oral hearing, the initialling was postponed.
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Agreement was not compatible with Community law,39 and fi-
nal agreement was reached on February 14, 1992. In Opinion
1/92, the European Court of Justice held that the revised draft
agreement was compatible with Community law.40 The Agree-
ment was initialled on April 14, 1992, and was signed at Oporto
on May 2, 1992.
The negotiations were based on the starting point that the
EFTA countries would accept the "acquis communautaire," that
is, the entire body of Community law, as contained in the Trea-
ties, Acts of Accession, legislation and the case-law of the Euro-
pean Court of Justice (with exceptions justified in the case of
the protection of fundamental interests) as the common legal
basis for the EEA. This would not however include the Com-
mon Agricultural Policy (CAP), which would not be covered by
the Agreement. Partly because of this, it was accepted from the
start that the EEA would not be a market without frontiers, as
border controls would remain.41 The essence of the agreement
however was the wholesale adoption by the EFTA countries of
Community legislation on the four fundamental freedoms and
flanking policies, referred to above, which constitute the heart
of the EEC Treaty.42
39 1991 E.C.R. 1-6079.
40 1992 E.C.R. 1-2821.
41 Hannibalsson, supra note 29, at 4.
42 It is centered on extending the four freedoms in the EEC Treaty to the
whole of the EEA. The Agreement thus provides for the free movement of goods,
persons, services and capital, although border controls will remain. Customs du-
ties and quantitative restrictions on imports and exports and measures having
equivalent effect are prohibited. There is a protocol on rules of origin and reviews
of the rules of origin will take place every two years. The exceptions provided by
Article 36 of the EEC Treaty are reproduced, as are the prohibitions of discrimina-
tory internal taxation contained in Articles 95 and 96 of the EEC Treaty. Article
37 of the EEC Treaty, on State monopolies of a commercial character, is also
transposed.
Although the CAP is not covered by the Agreement, as the EFTA countries are
to maintain their own policies, there is an evolutionary clause whereby the parties
agree to review agricultural issues. Veterinary and phytosanitary arrangements
are provided, as are arrangements for fish and other marine products.
There are provisions regarding the simplification of border controls and coop-
eration in customs matters. The Agreement does not provide for common external
tariffs, hence it is not a customs union, but Contracting Parties considering the
reduction of the level of duties or charges having equivalent effect applicable to
third countries benefiting from most-favoured nation treatment must notify the
EEA thirty days before such change comes into effect and must take note of any
11
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When it became apparent that the EFTA States would be
excluded from political participation in the decision-making
concerning the rules which were the subject of the Agreement,
the judicial system to be provided by the Agreement assumed,
in the view of the EFTA States, the complexion of a compensat-
ing mechanism for this exclusion. Thus, when the Court of Jus-
tice effectively ruled out, in Opinion 1/91, the possibility of
establishing an EEA Court, the EFTA negotiators publicly
linked the judicial mechanism with political participation and
declared that the impossibility of the former made concessions
on the latter imperative.43 The negotiations nearly foundered
on several occasions.
The Agreement on the European Economic Area (hereinaf-
ter referred to as the Agreement and the EEA respectively) of
May 2, 1992 gave the legal basis for greater integration in Eu-
rope, by permitting the establishment of a dynamic and homo-
geneous free trade area. The Agreement is in the form of a
global association agreement. The Agreement brings closer the
Member States of the EC and the countries of EFTA. Almost
immediately, and in some cases even before, the majority of the
EFTA States applied for full membership of the EEC, as it then
was. The Agreement is interesting as it could serve as a model
for the association of other States with the Community prior to
or in substitution for accession.
The Agreement does not alter a number of important areas.
It does not seek economic and monetary union, nor does it, for
example, provide for fiscal harmonisation, or for the application
representations by other Contracting Parties regarding any distortions which
might result therefrom.
Anti-dumping measures, countervailing duties and measures against illicit
commercial practices shall not be applied in relations between the Contracting
Parties, unless otherwise specified.
The Agreement provides for the easing of restrictions on capital movements,
but maintains some restrictions on some direct investments and on some real
property investment.
Finally, the Agreement provides for a solidarity or cohesion fund in order to
remedy the regional and social disparities within the Community. Promoted in the
context of the negotiations, largely at the insistence of Spain and Portugal, the
cohesion fund provides for 1.5 billion ECU in soft loans at 3 per cent, and five
annual grants of some 500 million ECU in total. The beneficiaries of the fund are
Portugal, Greece, Ireland, Northern Ireland and parts of Spain.
43 INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, Dec. 16, 1991, at 1; see INTERNATIONAL
HERALD TRIBUNE, Dec. 17, 1991 at 13.
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol7/iss1/1
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of the CAP. As border controls are maintained, the EEA does
not reap the full advantages of the internal market. Moreover,
the foreign relations of the EFTA countries with the rest of the
world are not modified, nor is there any requirement to create
an EEA approach in foreign and security policy, or cooperation
in judicial and home affairs. Although it is increasingly clear
that joint strategies are required on some matters of common
concern, such as immigration, even within the context of inter-
governmental cooperation, the EEA does not make such
provision.
It should be noted that in some respects, the Agreement
merely reflects an existing situation, which is now given a legal
and institutional context. Thus, the Community's technical
standards, for example, were already largely, even overwhelm-
ingly, met by the EFTA countries.
The Agreement is a mixed agreement. 44 The justification
for this is that some matters dealt with in the Agreement (such
as political dialogue) are not at first sight within exclusive Com-
munity competence. However, these are marginal to the thrust
of the Agreement. Mixed participation could have been avoided
by a parallel agreement between the Member States and the
EFTA States on these matters allowing participation in the
EEA Agreement by the Community alone with the EFTA
States, and it is believed that this would have been the solution
which the Commission would have favoured.
This then was broadly the situation at the time of signature
and subsequent ratifications of the TEU, discussed below. How-
ever, it was clear that Europe, as an entity, had yet to define
itself. The Community has become the magnet for its neigh-
bours, both East and South, who see in Europe the means by
which to achieve their economic aspirations. The Community
itself, as extended by the EEA (which has added another 30 mil-
lion of some of the most sophisticated consumers in the world to
the internal market), is now also a focus of attention on the
world stage. The United States, which had been inclined to be-
lieve that the next century would be centred on the Pacific Rim,
has become aware of the potential and competition which Eu-
rope offers, hence its concern over a "fortress Europe." The
44 See generally, MMIXD AGREEMENTS (David O'Keeffe & Henry G. Schermers
eds., 1992).
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Community as an entity is also increasingly an actor on the
world stage, particularly and most visibly in the GATT. Such
was the belief in the inevitability of Europe that the lack of
political co-ordination during the Gulf War was seen as proving
rather than disproving the imperative need to achieve a com-
mon foreign and security policy.
II. THE NATURE OF THE COMMUNITY LEGAL ORDER
The role played by the Court of Justice has been fundamental in
shaping the Community. From the very beginning, it
recognised that Community law constituted a new form of inter-
national law. It recognised the individual as well as the Mem-
ber States and the Community institutions as being subjects of
law in this new legal order, and it held that individuals could
invoke Community law before the national courts. It also em-
phasised that accession to the Community implied the transfer
to it by the Member States of sovereignty in certain limited
fields.45 It fashioned the principle, nowhere discernible in the
Treaty, that Community law should take priority over national
law,46 and that where there was a conflict, the national judge
before whom a case of such conflict arose, was bound to apply
Community law,47 even if this were subsequent to the Commu-
nity law provision in question. It created principles familiar to
students of federal systems such as pre-emption.48 Very impor-
tantly, the Court also recognised that the Treaty was not com-
plete, and it acknowledged that certain general principles of
law, including respect for fundamental human rights, were part
of the Community legal order, which must be respected by the
Community legislator, and by national courts applying Commu-
nity law. Recently, the Court has also held that an individual
may, under certain circumstances, sue the State for a breach of
Community law which has caused him or her harm and which
may be imputable to the State. 49
In Opinion 1/91 on the EEA Agreement, the Court made a
major contribution to its case-law on the Community's constitu-
45 ECR 1. Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos, 1963 E.C.R. 1.
46 Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 614.
47 Case 106/77, Simmenthal, 1978 E.C.R. 629.
48 See U.S. CONST. amend YX
49 Case C-6/90 Francovich v. Italian Republic, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5357.
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tional character. The Court had previously held in Les Verts50
and repeated in Zwartveld,51 that the Community is a Commu-
nity based on the rule of law, inasmuch as neither its Member
States nor its institutions can avoid a review of whether the
measures adopted by them are in conformity with the basic con-
stitutional charter, the Treaty. The reference in Opinion 1/91
characterising the EEC Treaty as the constitutional charter of a
Community based on the rule of law is therefore not new. How-
ever, this reference to constitutional values is externalised in
the present case, where constitutional values not only pre-
vented the signature of the Agreement as originally negotiated
by the Commission, but also prevented a modification of Article
238 of the EEC Treaty for the purposes of the Agreement.
Even though Article 228 of the EC Treaty provides for en-
try into force of an agreement which has been the subject of an
adverse opinion by the Court of Justice in accordance with Arti-
cle 236 of the Treaty, it would seem that the Court rules this out
where an amendment would conflict with Article 164, or more
generally, the very foundations of the Community. In this way,
it may be that the Court is establishing a hierarchy within the
Treaty, of certain norms which constitute the foundations of the
Community and which constitute points of reference by which
amendments are to be judged. If this interpretation is correct,
it marks another and major step in the constitutionalisation of
the Community.
It would therefore seem that the Court has limited the na-
ture of the modifications which the Member States may make to
the Treaty. This signals the further development of the Commu-
nity legal order as a new legal order of international law. The
sovereignty of the treaty-makers has been curtailed in so far as
they cannot make amendments which conflict with the "very
foundations" of the Community. This is reminiscent of Opinion
1/76,52 where the Court had discerned "a change in the internal
constitution of the Community by the alteration of essential ele-
ments of the Community structure" which was incompatible
with the Treaty.53
50 Case 294183, Les Verts v. European Parliament, 1986 E.C.R. 1339.
51 Case C-2/88 Imm., Zwartveld and Others, 1990 E.C.R. 1-3365.
52 Opinion 1/76, 1977 E.C.R. 741 12.
53 1977 E.C.R. 741, 12.
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The Court's approach in Opinion 1/91 also recalls the con-
sultative competence provided by Article 96 of the ECSC
Treaty. Under the third paragraph thereof, subsequent Treaty
amendments concerning the matters dealt with therein may not
conflict with the provisions of Articles 2, 3 and 4 of that Treaty
or interfere with the relationship between the powers of the
High Authority and those of the other institutions of the Com-
munity. Moreover, such amendments must be presented to the
Court. In its Opinion of December 17, 1959, the Court
characterised this Article as allowing an amendment under its
provisions "only where it does not interfere with the general
structure of the Treaty or the relationship between the Commu-
nity and the Member States."54 However, it should be noted
that the Court was speaking in that Opinion in the context of a
provision allowing "minor" amendments to the ECSC Treaty,
and did not fetter the amendment procedure provided by Article
96 of that Treaty. These are substantial differences compared
to Opinion 1/91.
The importance of the Court's role as a genuinely impartial
supranational forum for judicial review cannot be over-em-
phasised, particularly in moments of legislative inactivity.
Since 1989, there is also a Court of First Instance, attached to
the Court of Justice, the jurisdiction of which was enlarged on
June 8, 1993 by the Council. Under Council Decision 93/35055
amending Decision 88/591 establishing a Court of First In-
stance of the European Communities, 56 the Court of First
Instance is given jurisdiction as regards certain classes of action
brought by natural or legal persons including State aids and the
non-contractual liability of the Community, in addition to its ex-
isting jurisdiction in proceedings brought by natural or legal
persons which had been limited to staff cases, coal and steel
cases and competition cases, as well as related damages
claims.57
54 1959 E.C.R. 259, 268.
55 1993 O.J. (L 144) 21.
56 1988 O.J. (L 319) 1 amended 1988 O.J. (C 2215) 1.
57 Id.
[Vol. 7:1
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol7/iss1/1
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
III. THE MAASTRICHT TREATY ON EuRoPEAN UNION58
In 1990, the Member States convened two intergovernmental
conferences (IGCs) on EPU and EMU respectively. In my opin-
ion, the Member States were motivated to proceed in this way
by two major factors: first, the success of the SEA and of the
internal market program inspired further confidence in what
could be achieved in the short term in order to achieve economic
integration, leading to political integration. Economic and mon-
etary union was seen as part of this process. In addition, the
economic downswing already felt in the United States had not
yet reached the European economies. The second reason, I sub-
mit, relates to the events which have been described above: the
fall of the Berlin Wall and the unification of Germany. There
was a brief interval between German unification, which was
perfected on October 3, 1990 and the collapse of the Soviet bloc.
It was in this period that the Member States were keenly anx-
ious to anchor the united Germany to the Community, rather
than to look east-ward to the Soviet Union, which still appeared
to be a viable option.
History has its ironies. As the TEU was being negotiated,
virtually all of the factors influencing the starting of negotia-
tions disappeared. Thus, the economy in Europe entered into
recession, the Soviet bloc no longer constituted an appealing fo-
cus of interest for the united Germany, and most of all, cracks
began to appear in the faith which the public had in the Euro-
pean integration process. This last point is not surprising. In
so far as the end of the Cold War took away some of the secur-
ity-related concerns for a united Europe, so the very success of
the internal market program seemed, at least in the minds of
non-specialists, to suggest that the aims of European integra-
tion had been achieved.
The IGC's lasted for a year. Agreement was reached on the
text of the Treaty in December 1991, and the Treaty was signed
at Maastricht on February 7, 1992.
What was achieved at Maastricht by the TEU was star-
tling. The Member States created a European Union, which
would co-exist with the Community. Acting as the Union, the
58 For an analysis of the Treaty, see DAVID O'KEEFFE AND PATRICK M.
TWOMEY, LEGAL IssuEs OF THE MAASTRICHT TREATY (1994).
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Member States would cooperate in areas such as Foreign and
Security Policy, and Justice and Home Affairs (including immi-
gration and asylum) without surrendering sovereignty. Citi-
zenship of the Union was created, to co-exist with national
citizenship.
Within the Community, the Member States agreed to a se-
ries of deadlines to achieve EMU. The final deadline for the en-
try into force of EMU is stated to be January 1, 1999.5 9 At that
point, the relationship between the currencies of the Member
States who will participate in EMU will be irrevocably fixed,
and steps will be taken to proceed to a single currency, the
ECU.60O
Second, the Member States agreed to strengthen further
the powers of the European Parliament, by instituting a co-de-
cision procedure, which gives the European Parliament the
right of veto over legislation in certain cases.
The TEU also gives the Community a series of new "vir-
tual" competences in a range of areas such as education, voca-
tional training and youth policy, cultural policy, public health,
consumer protection, industry, research and technological de-
velopment, the environment and development cooperation.
The TEU introduced into the Treaty a general principle
known as the principle of subsidiarity,61 to which action taken
under the Treaty is subject. Under this rule, which rings like a
State-federal division of competence,
[tihe Community shall act within the limits of the powers con-
ferred upon it by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it
therein.
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the
Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of
subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and
can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed ac-
tion, be better achieved by the Community.
Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is neces-
sary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty.
59 TEU, supra note 1, art. 109j.
60 TEU, supra note 1, art. 1091(4).
61 Previously, the subsidiarity principle had been contained as a specific,
rather than a general rule, as regards the environment, in Article 130r(4) of the
EEC Treaty, a provision added to the EEC Treaty by the SEA.
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As yet, the principle of subsidiarity has not been tested before
the European Court of Justice. There is dispute over the mean-
ing of the principle, and as to whether it may be applied by the
European Court.6 2
One of the criticisms levied on the TEU is that it introduces
a new form of Treaty-making by mixing in one document mat-
ters falling under Community competence and matters falling
under Member State competence which they agree under the
TEU to treat inter-governmentally, that is, in cooperation.6 3
There is no doubt that this is true, and indeed the document
produced at Maastricht has destroyed the remarkably coherent
structure and symmetry of the original EEC Treaty. The rea-
son for the form chosen is evident. Member States were willing
to give the Community new or extended competence in some ar-
eas, but not in all. In specific areas, Member States considered
that it was essential to national sovereignty to retain powers
over certain issues, but nevertheless wished to cooperate with
the other Member States, using the Community structures and
institutions, without engaging in the transfer of sovereignty
which a transfer of competence to the Community would entail.
This was the case with regard to Title VI, TEU, entitled Justice
and Home Affairs, dealing with immigration and asylum mat-
ters, and with the Common Foreign and Security Policy, regu-
lated by Title V, TEU.64
However, it appears to me to be a mistake consider that
these two Titles, which together with Articles A-F and L-S,
TEU, constitute the inter-governmental part of the TEU, are
pure inter-governmental instruments. A contrast should be
made with the pure inter-governmental procedure and the
Community procedure. Under the Community process, legisla-
tion is proposed by the Commission, discussed, modified or re-
jected by Council and the European Parliament, adopted by the
Council or Commission, and is subject to judicial review by the
European Court of Justice. There is input from national parlia-
62 See A.G. Toth, A Legal analysis of subsidiarity; Josephine Steiner, Sub-
sidiarity under the Maastricht Treaty; and, Nicholas Emiliou, Subsidiarity: Pan-
acea or Fig Leaf? in DAVID O'KEEFFE AND PATRICK M. TWOMEY, LEGAL ISSUES OF
THE MAASTRICHT TREATY 37, 49, 65 (1994).
63 See Deirdre Curtin, The Constitutional Structure of the Union: a Europe of
bits and pieces, 30 COMMON MKr. L. REV. 17-69 (1993).
64 TEU, supra at note 1, Title V, [hereinafter CFSP].
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ments in the pre-legislative procedure in the consultation
phase, and from national courts, who may apply Community
legislation, and refer matters to the Court of Justice. Commu-
nity legislation must obey the case-law of the Court of Justice,
including the Court's rulings concerning respect for fundamen-
tal rights and the general principles of law. By contrast, under
the "pure" inter-governmental process, the Member States con-
clude an international agreement which is not proposed by the
Commission, subject to approval by the European Parliament,
subject to judicial review by the European Court, and depend-
ing on national law, may also not be subject to review by the
national courts. If at all, the International Court of Justice may
be competent, though it should be noted that not every Commu-
nity Member State has agreed to the compulsory jurisdiction of
the International Court.
The inter-governmental competence created by Titles V
and VI of the TEU is not "pure" in the sense described above.
Although competence is not transferred to the Community, and
although the Community process as such is generally excluded,
nevertheless there are a number of connecting points to the
Community. Thus, in Article K4 TEU, "[t]he Commission shall
be fully associated with the work in the areas referred to in this
Title." Under Article K6 TEU, the Presidency and the Commis-
sion shall regularly inform the European Parliament of discus-
sions in the areas covered by the Title. The European
Parliament is to be consulted on the principal aspects of the ac-
tivities covered by Title VI and its views must be "duly taken
into consideration." The European Parliament may ask ques-
tions of the Council or make recommendations to it, and every
year it is required to hold a debate on the progress made in im-
plementation of the areas referred to in Title VI.
Furthermore, under Article K3(2)(c) TEU, the Member
States may adopt conventions covering matters falling under
Title VI and may attribute jurisdiction to the Court of Justice to
interpret their provisions. Finally, Article K9 TEU provides
that a number of the areas referred to in Title VI may become a
matter of Community competence if the Council, acting unani-
mously, so decides.
Similar provisions and "bridges" between the Union and
the Community also are to be found in Title V as regards for-
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eign affairs. Finally, it should be pointed out that the Member
States act under Titles V and VI as the Council of the European
Union, which is also the Council for the purposes of the
Community.
The point of this detailed analysis is to show that the inter-
governmental method adopted by the Member States is not
"pure" inter-governmentalism, but rather provides for a variety
of links to the Community institutions, while allowing Member
States to co-operate inter-governmentally within the context of
the Union. Moreover, the inter-governmental method chosen is
dynamic: as provisions such as Article K9 TEU demonstrate,
there is the possible of a transfer of competence in areas of in-
ter-governmental cooperation from the Member States to the
Community.
This is not to endorse the TEU. It is a badly drafted docu-
ment. It is not transparent, and requires in order to read it, a
thorough knowledge of Community law to which it makes con-
stant and confusing cross-reference. Even the very numbering
is absurdly non-"user friendly," as provisions such as Article
K3(2)(c) show.
The TEU encountered severe difficulties before being rati-
fied by the Parliaments of the Member States and the European
Parliament. This now seems almost inevitable. The TEU had
been negotiated in secret. To be sure, there were the usual copi-
ous 'leaks' to the specialist press and to observers of Community
matters. However, the document was negotiated by techno-
crats, for technocrats. There was no appreciation that this doc-
ument, which aspired to a federal character, (even though this
is not specified in the Treaty itself), and which is supposed to
constitute the 'constitutional charter of a Community based on
the rule of law,'6 5 should be capable of being read, much less
understood, by the ordinary European.
The TEU was thrust upon the public by the 'naive elite' 66
which had drafted it, with the expectation that a public which
had heretofore supported European integration, would also sup-
port this latest step. This ignored the fact that firstly, the eco-
65 294183, Les Verts v. European Parliament 1986 E.C.R. 1339; Opinion 1/91,
1991 E.C.R. 1-6079.
66 To use a remarkably apt phrase which I first heard used by Professor Roger
Goebel of Fordham Law School.
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nomic climate had changed since the Rome summits in 1990
which had authorised the inter-governmental conferences. Sec-
ondly, the fall of the Soviet bloc may also have changed the way
in which Europeans view the Community. Its political vocation
no longer appears so necessary to some. Thirdly, it ignored the
fact that the Community was increasingly seen to be remote,
undemocratic, and bent on centralisation at the expense of the
Member States and the regions.
The rejection of the TEU by the Danish people on June 2,
1992, by a vote of 50.7 per cent to 49.3 per cent, was the first
occasion that an agreement between the Member States to
amend the fundamental Community treaties failed to be rati-
fied at national level. More than anything else, it highlighted
the fact that the further integration aspired to by the TEU,
however masked by its abstruse drafting, went far beyond what
was acceptable at national level. Following the Danish referen-
dum, the Irish people voted in a referendum on June 18, 1992 in
favour of the TEU by 69 per cent to 31 per cent. On September
20, 1992, the French people endorsed the Treaty in a referen-
dum by 51.05 per cent to 48.95 per cent.
As it became apparent that the Danish distrust of the TEU
provisions was shared by voters in other Member States, the
Member States reacted in three ways. First, the principle of
subsidiarity became of central importance in attracting public
support for the TEU. Thus, although the principle of sub-
sidiarity had received rather scant attention in Article 3b EC, it
became a key principle of Community law.67 At the Lisbon
summit on June 26-27, 1992, it was agreed that the Council and
the Commission would observe the principle of subsidiarity in
proposing, drafting and adopting legislation and that there
should be a re-examination of pending proposed legislation to
monitor it for compatibility with the principle of subsidiarity.
At the Edinburgh summit on December 11-12, 1992, the Euro-
pean Council agreed an overall approach to the application of
the subsidiarity principle, and laid down guidelines, procedures
and practices. The European Council also invited the Council to
seek an inter-institutional agreement between the European
Parliament, the Council and the Commission on the effective
67 Nugent, Editorial: The Treaty on European Union - Looking Rather Differ-
ent Twelve Months On, 31 JCMS ANNUAL REV. 1, 3 (1993).
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application of Article 3b. The Commission presented an initial
review of existing or proposed legislation which should be with-
drawn or amended in the light of the subsidiarity principle, and
the full review was presented to the European Council in De-
cember 1993. At the Copenhagen summit in June 1993, the Eu-
ropean Council noted that the Commission now submits
proposals only when it considers that they fulfil the subsidiarity
criteria. It 'welcomed' the substantial reduction in volume of
Community legislation foreseen in the Commission's legislative
programme for 1993 compared to earlier years. 68
Secondly, the Edinburgh European Council adopted meas-
ures to increase transparency and openness in the decision-
making process of the Community. These measures, like the
application of the subsidiarity principle, were intended to
counter the democratic deficit, by bringing the Community
nearer to its citizens.
Thirdly, the Edinburgh European Council adopted specific
measures to accommodate the Danish objections to the TEU.
The so-called Danish "opt-outs" from certain provisions of the
TEU concern Union citizenship, participation in the third stage
of EMU, defence policy, justice and home affairs (and freedom to
conduct a stricter national policy in the areas of social policy,
consumer policy, the environment and distribution of income).
The European Council purported to resolve the question by a
'Decision of the Heads of State and Government, meeting
within the European Council, concerning certain problems
raised by Denmark on the Treaty on European Union,' that is to
say, not a decision of the European Council, but rather an inter-
national agreement 'in simplified form.' 69 Given its legal nature
and the fact that it is not ratified by the national parliaments, it
does not in fact modify the TEU, nor does it take precedence
over it. Moreover, the Decision's content does not factually
modify the TEU but merely explains in some detail or clarifies
Denmark's obligations under the TEU. The impression was
given to the Danish electorate that a special position had been
won for Denmark, and it was presumably on this basis that the
68 Bull. EC 6-1993 point 1.22, 16.
69 Curtin and van Ooik, 'Denmark and the Edinburgh summit: Maastricht
without tears' in THE LEGAL ISSUES OF THE MAASTRICHT TREATY (David O'Keeffe
and Patrick M. Twomey eds., 1994).
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Danish people subsequently approved ratification of the TEU.
However, a particularly authoritative source maintains that
'Denmark's "special position" to a large extent appears to be a
legal mirage.'70
The success of these measures may be judged by the re-
sults. Ratification proceeded in the other Member States, and
on May 18, 1993, by a majority of 56.8 per cent, the Danish peo-
ple voted in a second referendum in favour of the TEU. In the
United Kingdom, the European Communities (Amendment) Act
1993 was enacted and entered into force following a vote on the
Protocol on Social Policy.71 The Act was immediately the sub-
ject of an unsuccessful application for judicial review.7 2 The
United Kingdom deposited the instrument of ratification in
Rome on Monday, August 2, 1993. The last State to ratify was
Germany, which had awaited the outcome of a unsuccessful
challenge to the TEU in a case before the Bundesverfassung-
sgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) on the compatibility of
the TEU with the German Basic Law.7 3 In accordance with Ar-
ticle R thereof, the TEU entered into force on the first day of the
month following the deposit of the instrument of ratification by
the last signatory State to take this step, that is, November 1,
1993.
However, a number of other events have occurred which
have diminished enthusiasm, at least temporarily, for the Euro-
pean ideal. This is surprising if one considers that the year
1992 should have been one of the Community's highest points.
The revitalisation of the Community, which began with the Sin-
gle European Act, seemed to have reached its apogee with the
signature of the TEU on February 7, 1992 and the conclusion of
the EEA Agreement on May 2, 1992. Almost immediately how-
ever, a whole series of issues combined to dissipate as though it
had never existed the optimism engendered at Maastricht and
Oporto when the TEU and the EEA Agreement were signed.
70 Id.
71 AGENCE EUROPE, No 6028 July 24, 1993, 3.
72 Regina v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Ex
parte Rees-Mogg, 1993 W.L.R. (Q.B. Div'l Ct.).
73 M. Herdegen, Maastricht and the German Constitutional Court: Constitu-
tional Restraints for an "ever closer union;" Documents "Extracts from: Brunner v.
The European Union (BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT), 31 COMMON MKT. L. REV.
235-262 (1994).
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i) The first such difficulty was economic. The world-wide
economic crisis affected the Community, with the result that it
was impossible to sustain the patterns of growth and conver-
gence which had underpinned moves towards closer European
integration. Massive unemployment combined with the threat
of social dumping to make the social protection systems of the
twelve Member States vulnerable. The economic crisis under-
cut the Community's economic base, which is the source of its
dynamism or lack of dynamism as the case may be.
ii) The second difficulty contributing to the decline of the
Community derived from the near-collapse of the Exchange
Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System
(EMS). The ERM has been subject to unparalleled speculative
pressures which damaged it severely, and have cast doubt on
the development of EMU. The ERM had enjoyed stability since
1987, the occasion of the last realignment. On September 13,
1992, the Italian lire was devalued; on September 16, 1992,
sterling and the lire suspended their membership of the ERM,
and the peseta was devalued. On November 23, 1992, the pe-
seta and the escudo were devalued, and the Irish punt was de-
valued in January and May 1993. On July 31, 1993, an
emergency Council of Finance Ministers recognised the virtual
breakdown of the system, and agreed to such wide fluctuation
bands (15 per cent) for most of the currencies remaining within
the EMS that the bands appeared to lose any real disciplinary
force. A consequence of this was the call from some observers
for an accelerated adhesion to EMU by some countries in order
to avoid currency instability of such magnitude (Germany,
France and the Benelux countries were most frequently men-
tioned) although others pointed to the fact that the conditions
for convergence necessary for the introduction of a single cur-
rency do not exist. Moreover, the convergence criteria posed by
the TEU74 seemed, in the light of the instability in the ERM, to
be inappropriate, would impose too high a price on some Mem-
ber States, and the timetable for convergence appeared
unrealistic.
It appears doubtful at the time of writing (September 1994)
that the timetable for EMU can be met. Although the second
74 TEU, supra note 1, art. 109j.
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stage, scheduled to begin on January 1, 1994, did meet the
Treaty deadline, it appears unlikely that the same will be true
of the third stage, which calls for the creation of the European
Central Bank, irrevocable fixing of conversion rates between
the currencies of the Member States and the rapid introduction
of the ECU as the single currency of the Member States.7 5
iii) The third structural difficulty of the Community arose
from its inability to develop a coherent foreign policy, particu-
larly with regard to ex-Yugoslavia. Possibly more than any-
thing else, this highlighted the weaknesses of European
integration, demonstrating that the Community and the Mem-
ber States acting together first in European Political Coopera-
tion and then under the terms of Title V of the TEU are unable
to react to a problem within Europe of this dimension. Individ-
ual Europeans feel shame and anger at the failure of the Twelve
to prevent the genocide taking place in Bosnia.76 Moreover, the
apparent indecision and powerlessness of the Twelve cast
doubts upon their ability to adhere to the provisions on the
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in Title V, TEU.77
It was clear during the inter-governmental conferences that the
CFSP would pose enormous problems: this was already evident
in the light of the Kuwait-Iraq Gulf War. As the TEU was not
yet in force, the Twelve initially reacted to the ex-Yugoslav con-
flict in the context of European Political Cooperation. The un-
derlying difficulties in achieving a common foreign policy,
common security policy and common defence policy have not
been resolved by the entry into force of the TEU. Rather, recent
experience would seem to show that the provisions will be use-
less without a common will for joint action. Thus, although the
Twelve issued numerous 'fairly consistent' declarations 78 on the
conflict in ex-Yugoslavia, they were unable to agree on a policy
for joint action. In addition, problems arose concerning uniform
enforcement of sanctions by at least one Member State, and in
the organisation of the naval blockade in the Adriatic.
75 TEU, supra note 1, art. 1091(4).
76 L. Neville Brown, Disunity in the Union: a personal view from Britain,
Guest Editorial, 30 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 1089, 1091 (1993).
77 TEU, supra note 1, Title V.
78 Nugent, supra note 67, at 5.
[Vol. 7:1
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol7/iss1/1
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
More recently, the Union has taken no concrete position as
regards Rwanda. The conclusions of the European Council
meeting in Corfu on June 24-25, 1994 merely promised humani-
tarian aid.79 It will be recalled that France, acting on its own,
did send troops to Rwanda.
iv) As regards the common commercial policy, a matter
which has always been part of Community competence, the
Community also showed that it was often unable to act with one
voice, with potentially damaging results for world trade. The
Community for a time appeared unable to achieve unanimity in
the context of the Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations.
It is submitted that the result of the factors outlined above,
together with more technical internal matters such as the diffi-
culties with the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy and
the fight over the allocation of financial resources needed to en-
able the Community to meet future challenges and 'to match its
ambitions' (the so-called Delors II package) weakened the Com-
munity internally as well as externally. In a remarkably frank
remark, President Delors acknowledged that 'routine coopera-
tion between our 12 countries has weakened in the face of these
developments.'8 0 This is an admission, evident to all observers,
that the period pending ratification of the Maastricht Treaty
has shown an extraordinary loss of political momentum. This
resulted not only from the loss of dynamism and institutional
self-confidence as a result of the ratification difficulties, but also
from a lack of economic and social credibility, all of which has
been freely admitted by the Commission.
IV. ENLARGEMENT: THE ACCESSION OF NEW MEMBERS
TO THE UNION
One of the greatest challenges facing the Union is that of
enlargement through the accession of new members. Paradoxi-
cally, in view of the difficulties undergone by the Community,
described above, it continues to be a pole of attraction for other
European States, although evidently the internal troubles re-
ferred to above have had their effect in causing unease particu-
larly among the applicant States.8 '
79 AGENCE EUROPE, No. 6260, July 26, 1994, 11.
80 Supra note 21, at 7.
81 Nugent, supra note 67, at 6-7.
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Five EFTA States made applications for accession: Aus-
tria,82 Sweden,8 3 Finland, 4 Switzerland 5 and Norway. 86 Ap-
plications were also made by Turkey, Cyprus, 87 and Malta. 8 In
1994, applications were made by Hungary and Poland, and
their applications are currently being reviewed by the European
Commission.
The Union has taken important decisions in this respect by
concluding accession negotiations with four EFTA States, Swe-
den, Norway, Austria and Finland. As a result, the Community
is committed to growing to 16 by January 1, 1995, provided that
the ratification process proceeds without difficulty in the appli-
cant countries.8 9 The Commission has also given positive opin-
ions on the accession of Cyprus and Malta to the Union. It has
also agreed that associated countries in Central and Eastern
Europe may accede to the European Union as soon as an associ-
ated country is able to assume the obligations of membership.
Thus, the number of Member States could increase to 22 with
the accession of the associated countries in Central and Eastern
Europe, 90 to 25 with the accession of the Baltic States, to 27
with the accession of Malta and Cyprus, and to 28 with the ac-
cession of Albania. Moreover, certain States of the ex-Yugosla-
via may wish to join the Union: the case of Slovenia is just one
example.
At the Lisbon summit on June 26-27, 1992, the European
Council took the view that the EEA Agreement paved the way
for opening enlargement negotiations with a view to an early
82 Bull. EC 7/8-1989 point 2.2.14.
83 Bull. EC 7/8-1991 point 1.3.3.
84 Bull. EC 3-1992 point 1.3.1.
85 As Switzerland rejected ratification of the EEA, its application to accede to
the Union has been effectively suspended.
86 Bull. EC 11-1992 point 1.4.3.
87 Bull. EC 7/8-1990 point 1.4.24.
88 Bull. EC 7/8-1990 point 1.4.25.
89 At the time of writing, Austria had already decided to join the Union.
Before the end of 1994, Finland, Sweden and Norway should hold referenda, in
that order, with the supposedly more enthusiastic populations voting first, and the
least enthusiastic, Norway, which had already rejected accession to the Commu-
nity in 1973, voting last. In this way it was hoped that the Norwegians, faced by
three positive votes of the other applicant countries, would feel isolated in Europe
if they too did not decide to join the Union.
90 The associated countries in Central and Eastern Europe include: Poland,
Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Bulgaria, Romania.
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conclusion with EFTA countries seeking membership of the
Union,91 and it invited the institutions to 'speed up' the prepar-
atory work needed to ensure rapid progress.92 In line with the
view taken at the European Council which finalised the TEU at
Maastricht, the European Council decided that the official nego-
tiations should not be opened until after ratification of the
Treaty on European Union, but then immediately. It also con-
sidered that agreement must first be reached on the Delors II
financial package. The general negotiation framework was
presented to the Council of Ministers on December 7, 1992. It
was decided by the Edinburgh summit that 'given the agree-
ment reached on future financing and the prospects for early
ratification' of the TEU,93 enlargement negotiations should
start with Austria, Sweden and Finland at the beginning of
1993, and with Norway once the Commission's opinion on its
application was available. It was also decided that the condi-
tions of admission of the new Member States would be based on
the acceptance in full of the TEU and the acquis corn-
munautaire, subject to possible transitional measures.
This insistence that new Member States should accept the
TEU and the acquis communautaire in full was also em-
phasised by President Delors. As he put it: 'new members will
have to accept the acquis communautaire in its entirety the
whole Union Treaty and nothing but the Union Treaty.'94 This
may seem contradictory in the light of the opt-outs for the
United Kingdom and Denmark contained in the TEU. How-
ever, President Delors characterised these opt-outs as "a long-
service bonus" which would not be available to new members.
Until now, this stance has been accepted by applicants for mem-
bership, but once they have been admitted to the Union, they
will have the same rights as other Member States. In the light
of the increased variable geometry in the Community, discussed
91 See Conclusions of the Presidency, AGENCE EUROPE No. 5760, 28 June 1992,
5. See also, Europe and the Challenge of Enlargement, AGENCE EUROPE, No. 1790,
3 July 1992. See also, The Benelux Memorandum on Enlargement, AGENCE Eu-
ROPE, No. 1789, 27 June 1992.
92 The decision concerning the EFTA countries contrasts strongly with that
concerning Turkey.
93 Bull. EC 12-1992 point 8.
94 Supra note 21, at 9.
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below, the new Member States may well take the view that they
wish to be part of variable speed arrangements.
The talks with Austria, Sweden and Finland began on Feb-
ruary 1, 1993. The Commission issued a positive opinion on
Norway's application on March 24, 1993, and the first meeting
with Norway took place on April 5, 1993. There were initial dif-
ficulties in launching the negotiations but these were overcome
and the process was accelerated. The Copenhagen European
Council of June 21-22, 1993 ambitiously set the date of January
1, 1995 as the date for the first enlargement of the European
Union through the accession of these four countries. The Edin-
burgh European Council in December 1992 invited the Commis-
sion, in preparing its opinion on the Swiss application, to take
into account the views of the Swiss authorities following the ref-
erendum on the EEA Agreement.
Since five EFTA countries have already applied to join the
Community, the EEA Agreement may have to be renegotiated
or even wound up if four of the EFTA countries accede. It could
have been thought that the EEA could continue to be used as a
waiting room for candidates for accession, such as Malta, Cy-
prus and possibly Turkey as well as the associated East Euro-
pean countries with which 'Europe' Agreements have been
concluded, and possibly eventually, other European countries.
However, it is noteworthy that following the important Com-
mission paper on enlargement presented at the Lisbon summit,
and subsequent European Council decision, although the Com-
mission discussed different forms of possible partnership this
possibility was not one of them.
Nevertheless, the EEA might be used as a model. One of
the formulas suggested by the Commission in its enlargement
paper was the possibility of associating other European coun-
tries as 'partner-members' in specific Community policies, with
the possibility to participate but not to vote in certain Commu-
nity meetings on subjects of trans-European interest, and a va-
riant on this was adopted by the Copenhagen European
Council, as is discussed below, specifically using the EEA trans-
European programmes as a model. The EEA experience may
give an indication as to how this form of cooperation, based on
exclusion from Community decision-making but association
with its policies, may work. The analogy may not be perfect: the
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EEA Contracting Parties are rather homogeneous. The EEA
may also serve as a model as to how Community law, suitably
transformed in national law, may be applied in States which
wish to apply for membership or participate in the benefits of
the Single Market.
On June 30, 1993, the Commission adopted positive opin-
ions on the applications of Cyprus9" and Malta.96 As regards
Cyprus, the Commission believed that its accession was subject
to the resolution of the conflict in Cyprus, but this condition has
since been lifted. As regards Malta, the Commission indicated
that Maltese neutrality would require a constitutional amend-
ment to allow it to fulfil its responsibilities under the TEU. The
Commission also suggested beginning a dialogue with Malta in
order to prepare it for accession to the Community, by making
economic reforms, technical assistance, financial cooperation
and other aid. For both countries, the Commission stated that
the 1996 inter-governmental conference should study the insti-
tutional consequences of the accession of these small countries
to the Community.
At the Corfu summit on June 24-25, 1994, the European
Council decided that Cyprus and Malta should join the Union in
the next phase of enlargement, that is, after the 1995
accessions.
V. CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE AND THE EUROPE
AGREEMENTS
At the Copenhagen summit in June 1993, the European
Council decided that the countries in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope with which the Community has or plans to conclude Eu-
rope Agreements (hereinafter associated countries) should
become members of the European Union. This is a major step,
as previously it had been unclear whether these countries
would qualify for membership. The decision also reflects how
quickly the Community is reacting to the changing events in the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Indeed, although the
tragedy of ex-Yugoslavia overshadows the Community's per-
formance, its handling of relations with the other countries in
95 COM(93)313; Bull. EC 6-1993 point 1.3.6.
96 COM(93)312; Bull. EC 6-1993 point 1.37.
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the area is quite impressive, although many observers in these
countries resent the 'take-it-or-leave-it' approach dictated by
the Community. The Copenhagen European Council decided
that accession will take place as soon as an associated country
is able to assume the obligations of membership by satisfying
the economic and political conditions required. The Council set
important conditions for membership by these countries: mem-
bership requires that the candidate country has achieved stabil-
ity of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law,
human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the
existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capac-
ity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within
the Union. Membership is deemed to presuppose the candi-
date's ability to take on the obligations of membership including
adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary
union.97 Thus here too, the Twelve insist on an acceptance of
the acquis communautaire and the TEU in its totality.
The European Council in Copenhagen also took important
decisions concerning future cooperation with the associated
countries geared to the objective of membership. A multilateral
framework for a strengthened high-level dialogue and consulta-
tion on matters of common interest, arising in the Union's
area's of competence has been set up in parallel with the bilat-
eral structure of the Europe Agreements. Specific areas men-
tioned include the three pillars of the Union Treaty: Community
areas with a trans-Europe dimension (energy, environment
etc,), CFSP and Justice and Home affairs. The CFSP arrange-
ments are particularly detailed and call for close cooperation
and consultation, including before important meetings in the
UN General Assembly and the CSCE. Other measures adopted
include improved access for the associated countries to the
Community market (more favourable quotas, duties and revised
rules of origin), more effective development assistance (PHARE
programme, loans), increased participation in the Community
programmes which are already open for participation by EFTA
countries, and measures leading to the approximation of laws.
Under this heading, the associated countries had already un-
dertaken to implement within three years from the entry into
97 Bull. EC 6-1993, point 1.13.
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force of the Europe Agreements rules parallel to those in the
EEC Treaty concerning competition and State aids, and the Eu-
ropean Council emphasised as regards the new arrangements,
the importance of approximation of laws in the associated coun-
tries to those applicable in the Community with regard to pro-
tection of workers, the environment and consumers. 98
Former Czechoslovakia. The Community originally con-
cluded a Europe Agreement with the former Czech and Slovak
Federal Republic. On June 23, 1993, the Commission and the
Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic initialled draft Europe
Agreements whereby the latter two States assumed the obliga-
tions of the former Federal Republic under the original Europe
Agreement." s
Romania and Bulgaria. Further Europe Agreements and
accompanying Interim Agreements were concluded as mixed
agreements by the Community and its Member States. A Eu-
rope Agreement with Romania was adopted by the Council on
December 21, 1992,100 and a Europe Agreement with Bulgaria,
together with an Interim Agreement, was initialled on Decem-
ber 22, 1992.101
The Baltic States and Albania. On May 11, 1992, the Com-
munity concluded 10-year agreements with Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania on trade and commercial and economic coopera-
tion.10 2 In order to strengthen the trade and commercial links
between the three Baltic States and the Community, the Copen-
hagen European Council in June 1993 invited the Commission
to submit proposals for developing the existing trade agree-
ments with the Baltic States into free-trade agreements. The
Council stated that 'it remains the objective of the Community
to conclude Europe Agreements with the Baltic States as soon
98 The European Council also urged that officials from the associated coun-
tries should receive training in Community law and procedure (with the technical
assistance of the Community) to prepare for accession, and that a task force of
representatives of the Member States and the Commission will be set up to coordi-
nate the work of approximation of legislation.
99 Bull. EC. 6-1993 point 1.3.17-18.
100 Bull. EC 12-1992 point 1.4.14.
101 Bull. EC 12-1992 point 1.4.11-12, initialled on December 22, 1992.
102 Council Decisions of December 21, 1992 on the conclusion of the Agree-
ments, 1992 OJ (L 403) 1 (Estonia), 10 (Latvia), 19 (Lithuania). Council Decision
of October 26, 1992 on the Agreement with Albania, Bull. EC 10-1992 point 1.4.11.
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as the necessary conditions have been met."03 No similar decla-
ration of intent was made as regards Albania.
The relations with the Baltic States neatly demonstrate the
way in which the Community develops links with other States
which are potential applicants for membership. Trade, coopera-
tion and other agreements tend to be the first step, followed by
free trade agreements, followed by Europe association Agree-
ments. The Europe Agreements aim principally at contributing
to the development of the associated countries with a view to
their possible accession. Although integration is thus their
long-term aim, the more immediate aim is to assist in bringing
about the conditions of the market economy and greater conver-
gence between the associated countries and the Member States.
VI. BROADENING AND DEEPENING THE CoMMUNITY
The Commission's reference to the institutional conse-
quences of accession in its opinions on the applications of Cy-
prus and Malta for accession underlines the fact that the
enlargement of the Community will have important institu-
tional consequences. 0 4 However, although the Community has
decided on large-scale enlargement, it has not yet come to terms
with the institutional consequences thereof. The debate on
'broadening and deepening' the Community turns on two issues:
expanding the membership of the Community and increasing
the Community's competences. At the time of the inter-govern-
mental conferences leading up to the TEU, it was decided to
concentrate only on the issue of Community competences, leav-
ing aside the question of how the Community should expand in
the coming years and how its institutions and policies will have
to change as a result.
It is clear that the institutional consequences of enlarge-
ment are vital. At the moment, each Member State is repre-
sented in the Council, and has 'its' members in the Commission,
the Court of Justice, the Court of First Instance and the Court
103 Bull. EC 6-1993 point 1.14.
104 Ungerer, Institutional consequences of broadening and deepening the Com-
munity: the consequences for the decision-making process, 30 COMMON Mir. L. REV.
71 (1992).
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of Auditors. 105 Moreover, the composition of Parliament is not
related strictly to population but gives a greater weight to small
countries which would otherwise have small delegations. The
weighted voting arrangements in the Council follow this princi-
ple in ensuring that the small countries are not systematically
overridden by the large countries. All of these arrangements
would have to be revised in the context of a Union of 20 mem-
bers, not to speak of a potential 28 or more. Otherwise all the
institutions of the Community (including the Parliament) would
risk becoming unwieldy if current patterns of representation
were continued. Moreover, the increase in numbers could dis-
tort current working practices. A favourite example of this con-
cerns the troika of Council ministers. The troika is composed of
the current, previous and future presidents in office of the
Council, and acts on behalf of the Community in European
Political Cooperation. A troika composed (as it could be under
current rules) of Latvia, Lithuania and Luxembourg is appar-
ently considered by the Commission not to be sufficiently repre-
sentative or weighty. Inevitably it is suspected that the
Commission (or the larger Member States) will propose institu-
tional changes to the detriment of the smaller Member
States. 0 6 Clearly, this would raise questions as to the demo-
cratic deficit, and to the equal participation of all States in the
Union's decision-making and judicial processes.
The difficulties which will be caused by enlarging the Com-
munity/Union were brought into stark relief in 1994, after the
negotiations for accession to the Union of Austria, Finland, Nor-
way and Sweden had been concluded. The United Kingdom and
Spain challenged the decision 07 according to which negotia-
tions for enlargement could not be used as an occasion to
change the Treaty rules on qualified majority voting in the
Council, with the exception of the purely arithmetical adjust-
105 There is no nationality requirement for members of the three Courts,
although in fact only nationals of the Member States are nominated by their Gov-
ernments, whereas there is such a nationality requirement for members of the
Commission. Members of the Institutions are required to be independent of the
Member States.
106 A document purporting to be such a plan was "leaked" in Denmark prior to
the first referendum on the TEU.
107 Adopted unanimously at the European Council meeting in Lisbon in 1992
and confirmed by it at Copenhagen in 1993.
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ment of the votes required to adopt a decision for which a quali-
fied majority vote is necessary. In 1994, before accession of the
new Member States, in cases where the Council may adopt leg-
islation by a qualified majority vote, such an act requires 54
votes out of a total of 76 weighted votes (each large country hav-
ing 10 votes and the smaller countries lesser numbers).10 8 This
means that 23 votes are needed for a "blocking minority." If all
four aspirant countries join the Union in 1995, they will receive
a total of 14 weighted votes and by arithmetical extrapolation,
the qualified majority will go up to 64, and the blocking minor-
ity to 27.
As a result, if this formula is used, it will become slightly
more difficult in the future to block legislation. The United
Kingdom and Spain regarded this as unacceptable and de-
manded that the blocking threshold should remain at 23 votes,
and that the influx of a number of small countries should not
lead to an effective weakening of the large countries' blocking
power.
As a result, a compromise was reached, very reminiscent of
the Luxembourg Compromise mentioned above, and using
much the same language.10 9 According to this new agreement,
called the Ioannina Compromise, the twelve Member States
agreed that in the event that four new Member States should
join the Union, the threshold for qualified majority voting
should be set at 64. They also agreed that the matter should be
considered at the IGC in 1996. However, they further agreed
that if Member States representing a total of 23 to 26 votes indi-
cate their intention to oppose the taking of a Council decision by
qualified majority, the Council will make every effort to find a
satisfactory solution that can be adopted by at least 68 votes,
within a reasonable period and without prejudicing the compul-
sory limits fixed by the Treaties and secondary law.
The result of the Ioannina Compromise is unclear. It is
probably not a legal document, but merely a political statement.
There is a notable difference with the Luxembourg Compro-
mise: in the Ioannina Compromise, a time limit of"a reasonable
period" is set to find a solution. No one knows what this might
108 EEC Treaty, supra note 7, art. 148.
109 AGENCE EUROPE, No. 6201, March 30, 1994.
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be. Under Article 7 of the Council's Rules of Procedure, 110 any
Member State may call for a vote in Council, and if supported
by the majority, this request must be complied with.
The Ioannina Compromise is an uncomfortable reminder of
the early history of the Community. It could have a profoundly
negative effect on the Union's activity if used in practice. Even
the very threat to invoke it may block legislation being proposed
or moved forward. It is therefore clear that the Compromise
should not be allowed to last. The Union cannot have a deci-
sion-making procedure which effectively is undermined by the
Ioannina Compromise, undoing the valuable progress made
through the large-scale introduction of qualified majority voting
in the Council by the SEA.
The TEU and subsequent events have also raised the issue
of the "two-speed Europe," a "multi-speed Europe" and "variable
geometry". This jargon reflects the fact that there is a growing
concern as to whether it is feasible to expect all Member States,
particularly new Member States, but also those with reserva-
tions about the political aims of the Union, to proceed towards
European integration at the same speed. Thus, it is conceived
that it may be possible for there to be a "hard core" of Member
States in the "fast lane," with another group either permanently
in the "slow" lane or, more likely, able to switch from one lane to
another depending on the subject matter. Thus, the United
Kingdom could be in the slow lane on social matters but it could
be in the fast lane as regards EMU. This latter version is
known as Europe d la carte.
The so-called Danish opt-outs to the TEU, whatever their
legal value, reflect a growing tendency towards a fragmentation
on the part of the Member States, where the Twelve apparently
recognise that not every Member State may be able to accept
every policy. The two-speed Europe has effectively been re-
placed by the Europe of a variable geometry or a Europe e la
carte. Thus, the United Kingdom obtained its own opt-outs in
the TEU as regards social policy, and potentially, as regards
EMU.11 The TEU itself provides for the possibility of the third
stage of EMU starting with a mere majority of Member
110 Council Decision 93/662/EC of December 6, 1993 OJ, (L304) 1.
111 Protocol 11 on certain provisions relating to the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Ireland (EMU); Protocol 14 on social policy.
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States 1 2 and it cannot be excluded that the constitutional con-
ference to be called in 1996 to revise the Treaty will decree that
EMU may begin with an even smaller number of participating
States. Moreover, the Commission has given its blessing to the
inter-governmental initiative on the Schengen Convention on
the abolition of internal border controls which also has the par-
ticipation of only a majority of Member States. Inevitably,
therefore, the impression is given that this sort of fragmenta-
tion is increasing and that previous expectations of uniform pro-
gress towards European integration may need to be revised.
The summer of 1994 was enlivened by a debate in Euro-
pean circles on a variable geometry or two-speed Europe, as a
result of a paper produced by the CDU, one of the governing
parties in the German Government. This proposal foresaw Eu-
ropean integration going forward with only a small "hard-core"
group of nations, essentially Germany, France and the Benelux
countries. The proposal was hotly contested by the Italian and
United Kingdom Governments, caused dismay in Sweden and
Finland, two aspirant members, and was disavowed by the Ger-
man and French Governments. 11 3 However, the issue is one
that is going to confront the Union in the future, particularly at
the 1996 IGC.
I think that various forms of a two-speed or multi-speed
Europe, or variable geometry or Europe e la carte are inevitable
in view of the process of broadening and deepening the Commu-
nity. We cannot realistically expect the same level of, for exam-
ple, environmental standards in Central and Eastern European
countries as in the original twelve Member States, at least not
immediately. Likewise, some countries may not be able to pro-
ceed with EMU for some time, as the economic convergence cri-
teria which determine a Member State's ability to adhere to
EMU, are severe.
It seems only a matter of common sense therefore that
some form of variable geometry should be acceptable. There
should however be an obligation of result: all Member States
should be required to achieve the Community aims, but given
different deadlines to do so. They should not be allowed to opt
out of a Community aim permanently as has occurred in the
112 TEU supra note 1, art 109j(3).
113 INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, September 8, 1994 at 2.
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case of the United Kingdom with the social policy opt-out con-
tained in the TEU. Moreover, it is imperative that certain mat-
ters are not negotiable. Thus, the fundamental principles of the
Community such as democracy and respect for the rule of law
must not be the subject of variable geometry agreements. All
countries must respect the European Court's case-law on
human rights. Basic principles of the Community legal order
such as equal treatment for men and women, and non-discrimi-
nation on the grounds of nationality must apply to all Member
States immediately. However, even this is difficult, considering
the state of the economy of some aspirant Member States. Nev-
ertheless, this is an area in which the Member States should
not compromise. If necessary, the European Parliament, which
has emerged as the champion of individual liberties and respect
for fundamental rights should refuse to approve the accession of
a new State, using its powers under Article 0 TEU, unless it is
clear that such guarantees are present.
VII. THE INTERNAL MARKET
According to Article 7a of the EC Treaty, the internal mar-
ket was to be established by December 31, 1992. In fact,
although steady progress was made towards this end, the inter-
nal market was not entirely completed by the deadline. In its
Seventh Report on the Implementation of the White Paper of
1985,114 the Commission took stock of the significant progress
that was made during the final year of the internal market pro-
gramme and which concerned notably, the mutual recognition
of diplomas, certain technical harmonization measures, and the
liberalisation of transport. In the field of insurance services,
the third life assurance directive was adopted, marking the
completion of the internal market in the insurance field. 115 The
directive coordinates the principal rules governing prudential
and financial supervision, provides for the mutual recognition of
authorizations granted to insurance undertakings and of the
systems of prudential supervision in the different Member
States, the granting of a single authorization valid throughout
114 COM(92)383 final.
115 Council Directive 92/96 on the coordination of laws, regulations and admin-
istrative provisions relating to direct life assurance (third life assurance Directive),
1992 O.J. (L 360).
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the Community and the supervision of all of an undertaking's
activities by the Member State of origin.
There were also measures concerning works of art, includ-
ing a Regulation on the export of cultural goods1 16 and a Direc-
tive on the return of cultural objects unlawfully removed from
the territory of a Member State.117 The financial services pack-
age was achieved through the adoption of the investment serv-
ices directive (based on the single investment licence known as
the 'European passport')"18 and the capital adequacy directive.
Progress was also made in tax harmonisation, notably the fixing
of the minimum 15 per cent VAT rate until end 1996 (zero-rat-
ing and super-reduced rates are authorised on a transitional ba-
sis), and the setting of minimum rates of excise duties on
alcohol and other alcoholic beverages, tobacco and mineral
oils. 1" 9 The Council also adopted three directives on public pro-
curement, on tendering procedures for supplies and public
works and on opening up public procurement in the heretofore
excluded services sector (water, energy, transport and telecom-
munications). 120 There was little progress in the intellectual
property field.' 2 '
In 1992, the Commission had proposed all the necessary
Single Market directives. The focus then turned on the Com-
munity legislator for the adoption of the necessary Community
legislation, and on the national parliaments and Member State
Governments for their transposition into national law. By the
end of 1992, 95 per cent of the 282 White Paper proposals had
been adopted, but less than half of these were transposed into
116 Bull. EC 11-1992 point 1.3.21.
117 Council Directive 93/7 on the return of cultural objects unlawfully removed
from the territory of another Member State 1993 O.J. (L 74).
118 Bull. EC 12-1992 point 1.3.45.
119 Council Directive 92/77 1992 O.J. (L 316).
120 Bull. EC 6-1993 point 1.2.35-38.
121 Council Directive 92/100 on rental right and lending right and on certain
rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual property 1992 O.J. (L 346);
proposal for a Council Directive harmonizing the term of protection of copyright
and certain related rights, Bull. EC 1/2-1993 point 1.2.34; proposal for a Council
Directive on the legal protection of databases, Bull. EC 11-1992 point 1.3.40; pro-
posal for a Council regulation on the Community trade mark, Bull. EC 11-1992
point 1.3.41; proposal for a Council directive on the coordination of certain rules
concerning copyright and neighbouring rights applicable to satellite broadcasting
and cable retransmission, Bull. EC 5-1993 point 1.2.21.
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the national law of all the Member States. Moreover, 18 White
Paper proposals were still pending before the Council.
Decisions have still not been taken in areas of fundamental
importance. The issue of the abolition of internal border con-
trols has not been resolved. The Commission decided that it
would not bring actions against Member States for their failure
to abolish border controls on persons after January 1, 1993,
although it recognised that it is "the thorniest problem" in the
achievement of the Single Market. 122 However, it is under-
standable that the Member States did not feel able to proceed
with the abolition of border controls as two conventions vital for
the establishment of the internal market in persons have not
been ratified or entered into force. The External Frontiers Con-
vention, a prerequisite for the internal market through the es-
tablishment of a strong external frontier remains deadlocked
because of a dispute between the United Kingdom and Spain
over the status of Gibraltar, and an alternative draft Council
Decision proposing such a Convention is still under considera-
tion.123 There have also been delays in ratifying the Dublin
Convention determining the State responsible for examining
asylum applications, another part of the structure required for
a common European immigration policy.
The legal significance of Article 7a is actually unclear. In
its Seventh Report, the Commission reaffirmed the interpreta-
tion it had given to the provision in its communication of May 8,
1992.124 The Commission maintains that Article 7a establishes
a clear and precise obligation that allows no margin of discre-
tion. This languages indicates that the Commission believes
that the provision may have direct effect which could be invoked
by an individual before a national court. However, authorita-
tive academic commentators differ over the significance of the
date of December 31, 1992, and as to whether it imposes en-
forceable obligations on Member States and rights on individu-
als which may be recognised by national courts and the
European Court of Justice. 125 Eventually the European Court
may have to decide whether the Commission's interpretation of
122 The Commission's work programme for 1993-94, Supp. 1/93 Bull. EC, 17.
123 COM(93)684 final.
124 COM(92)877 final.
125 See supra note 26.
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Article 7a is consistent with the interpretation to be given to the
Declaration on Article 8a (as it then was) which was appended
to the SEA, according to which 'setting the date of 31 December
1992 does not create an automatic legal effect.'
The European Parliament decided in July 1993 to bring an
action for failure to act against the Commission under Article
175 of the EC Treaty, on the grounds that the Member States
had violated the Treaty by maintaining border controls and that
the Commission should have brought an action before the Euro-
pean Court of Justice under Article 169 of the EC Treaty to
have the infringement established. 126 Whether this action will
succeed will depend not only on the interpretation to be given to
the setting of the date of December 31, 1993. The Court will
also have to decide whether the Parliament is entitled to bring
such an action. The question which arises is whether such an
action, which is essentially an action to monitor the Commis-
sion's use of its discretion to bring enforcement actions under
Article 169, is available under Article 175. It could be argued
that under the system of the Treaty for enforcement actions,
Articles 169 and 170 reserve to the Commission and the Mem-
ber States the power to bring the matter of a breach of the
Treaty before the European Court of Justice. The other Institu-
tions are not mentioned in Article 170. One authoritative com-
mentary on Community law states that in practice the
Commission enjoys full powers of discretion as to whether to
initiate an action for judicial review of Member States' acts, but
does not advert to this particular sort of situation.127 The case-
law is not especially helpful in deciding the point, as previous
cases have turned on an individual's right to sue the Commis-
sion for failure to bring an action under Article 169,128 whereas
the rights of a Community institution raise very different ques-
tions within the framework set up by the Treaty. Other cases
have concerned actions for failure to act which did not involve
challenging the Commission's use of its discretion not to bring
an Article 169 action.
126 AGENCE EUROPE, No. 6023 July 16, 1993 at 7.
127 SCHERMERS AND WAELBROECK, JUDICIAL PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN
CoMMumrs 309 (5th ed. 1992).
128 See Case 247/87, Star Fruit v. Commission, E.C.R. 291 (1989).
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It is also possible as Commissioner Vanni d'Archirafi, re-
sponsible for the internal market, maintained,129 that the Par-
liament's action could lead to a limitation of the Commission's
powers, a result which would be precisely the opposite of that
desired by the Parliament.
In its Seventh Report, the Commission identified four other
areas, apart from the suppression of border checks on persons,
where there was cause for concern in the implementation of the
internal market: the harmonisation of indirect taxation, the cre-
ation of a Community patent and trademark, harmonisation of
company law including the creation of the European company
and the harmonisation of corporate taxation including the aboli-
tion of double taxation on undertakings and allowance for losses
in another Member State. A number of supplementary propos-
als have to be adopted dealing with observance of copyright and
neighbouring rights. The Commission's legislative programme
for 1993-94 contains not just technical matters but also highly
complicated and tendentious issues such as in the audiovisual
services (including HDTV) and financial services areas (super-
vision of financial groups).' 30
On October 26, 1992, the Commission received the Suther-
land Report on the future of the Single Market after 1992. The
Report examines the issues which need to be resolved to enable
the internal market to be administered fairly and effectively
under the headings of communication, access to justice and ad-
ministrative partnership.
Under the heading of communication, the Report recom-
mends that much more needs to be done to inform market sub-
jects as to what to expect and what to do if they encounter
problems. The Commission should set up a strategy for im-
proving information but it will be up to the Member States to
increase awareness and understanding by consumers and eco-
nomic operators of Community measures which affect their
legal position.
Public confidence should be boosted by remedying short-
comings in Community decision-making. The Commission
could make public, at an early stage, its intention to propose
129 AGENcE EUROPE, No. 5987, May 26, 1993 at 12.
130 The Commission's legislative programme for 1993-94, 1/93 Bull. EC 30-36.
1995]
43
PACE INT'L L. REV.
legislation; there should be hearings, and a dialogue with inter-
ested parties (consumer groups, trade and professional or-
ganisations etc.). Community legislation, frequently so dense
as to be understood only by technocrats, should be made more
transparent. It should also be consolidated from time to time,
producing a single authoritative text combining the initial text
and all subsequent amendments. Where approximation has
been successful, directives should be transformed in regulations
to allow market operators and national administrations to refer
only to one text, valid throughout the Community. The Report
also notes that the pace of the 1992 legislative process resulted
in the adoption of anomalies, contradictory legislation or con-
flicting linguistic versions, which need to be corrected as they
impede the proper implementation and application in the Mem-
ber States. The Commission should avoid proposing legislation
on the basis of an exclusively sectoral approach which can lead
to contradictions. It should have a unit to coordinate legislative
proposals, and all such proposals should be based on a uniform
application of five criteria: need, effectiveness, proportionality,
consistency and communication. The Commission should carry
out regular reviews of the real impact of Community legislation
and of the principle of mutual recognition of national regulation
in non-harmonised areas.
The Sutherland Report was also concerned with the effec-
tiveness of judicial protection in the Community. There is an
urgent need for more information and better advice for those
who seek legal redress in connection with Community law
rights. The Commission and the Member States should do
more to give market subjects guidance on issues such as
whether a complaint falls within the scope of Community law,
whether a case should be brought before national courts or the
European Court of Justice or Court of First Instance, when to
submit problems to the national administrations and when and
how to approach the Commission directly, and whether non-ju-
dicial mechanisms such as the ombudsmen or consumer guar-
antee schemes could afford adequate redress. The Report also
points to the problems caused by the widely differing rules in
the Member States governing access to the Courts and suggests
that the Commission should make a report on these issues. The
knowledge of Community law of judges and lawyers in the
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Member States needs to be improved. Sometimes the national
courts have only limited powers to make interim orders against
alleged infringements, and the success of a Francovich-type
claim for damages caused by a Member State's infringement of
Community law depends on the workings of national rules of
procedure, particularly as regards the standards of proof re-
quired. The Commission is urged to make a statement on the
implications of the Francovich judgment, there should be reme-
dies directives prescribing the redress available to persons af-
fected by breaches of the law and 'mediators' should be
appointed in the Member States to take up cases against the
national authorities. Penalties should be 'Community-minded'
and should not vary widely from one Member State to another.
As regards the issue of administrative co-operation, the
partnership between the Commission and the Member States
which is designed to help the Member States apply Community
law and the Commission to supervise its application and to as-
sist in problem-solving, should be emphasised and contact
groups established. There should be a rapid agreement on in-
formation-sharing, pooling of expertise and the establishment
of case-handling procedures. The Commission should make an-
nual reports on the functioning of the internal market. Imple-
mentation of Community law should be followed closely and the
results made public.
The Commission's initial response to the Sutherland Re-
port was adopted on December 2, 1992131 and presented to the
Edinburgh European Council.132 The Commission and Euro-
pean Council's responses were positive. The Commission wel-
comed the recommendation for an annual report on the Single
Market, and the first such report will be published in the second
half of 1993. As regards the recommendations for preparing
Community legislation, the Commission noted that the sub-
sidiarity principle would be respected in preparing legislative
proposals, and that regard would be had to the Sutherland cri-
teria of need for action and the effectiveness and proportionality
of the action taken. It undertook to come up with a solution in
mid-1993 to the problem of excessive fragmentation of its legis-
lative activities. Similar action should also be taken in the
131 SEC (92) 2277 final; Bull. EC 12-1992 point 1.3.14.
132 Bull. EC 12-1992 point 1.9, 11.
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other Institutions and in the Member States to safeguard
against inconsistency. As regards the publication of legislative
intentions, the Commission is prepared to publish-its legislative
intentions in the Official Journal when 'it sets about preparing
a proposal' for the Council and where there is no urgency in-
volved. The details published would include the objectives pur-
sued, the grounds for the initiative and the results of
preliminary surveys in the light of the Sutherland five criteria.
Interested parties would be invited to make observations. The
Commission recalled that the Birmingham European Council of
16 October 1992 had welcomed the Commission's offer to con-
sult more widely before proposing legislation and the use of con-
sultation documents (green papers). 133
As regards transparency in the application of Community
law, the Commission will make available to the Member States
all the transposition measures adopted and will provide infor-
mation on the administrative arrangements for implementing
Community instruments. It will also publish guides to the
elimination of technical barriers to trade. The Commission
agreed with the Report that national systems of sanctions form
an integral part of the measures transposing directives into na-
tional law. The Member States will therefore be required to in-
clude in the transposition measures notified to the Commission
the national procedures for monitoring the implementation of
Community instruments and for imposing sanctions in this
connection.
The Commission will establish a network of contact points
between Member States' administrations responsible for imple-
menting the operational rules of the internal market, and
proposals for administrative cooperation, including data-trans-
mission networks, in the different areas of the Single Market
will be made to the Council. The Commission will set up with
the Member States a crisis unit to handle urgent problems that
are not covered by other current early-warning mechanisms.
As regards the recommendations on access to justice and
judicial cooperation, the Commission considers that this is pri-
marily an area for the Member States. However, it is willing to
look at means of providing information to market subjects about
133 Bull. EC 10-1992 point 1.8, 8.
[Vol. 7:1
46http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol7/iss1/1
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
means of redress at national level, and at a training programme
for the legal profession and consumer bodies. The Commission
will prepare a communication on the basis of the Francovich
judgment on compensation for damage caused to individuals by
breaches of Community law, in line with the Sutherland recom-
mendation. It will consider the suggestion of the appointment
of 'mediators' for redress as regards public procurement.
The Commission will make a Communication to the Coun-
cil and to the Parliament after carrying out a survey of national
procedural rules and the system of sanctions as part of the mon-
itoring of the application of Community law. The Commission
broadly accepts the Report's comments on consolidation of legis-
lation and the use of regulations where possible.
The Sutherland Report has an importance going beyond the
internal market. Its legislative criteria are useful also for the
application of the subsidiarity principle. Likewise, the com-
ments on access to justice and the system of sanctions are use-
ful for the enforcement of Community law generally. The
recommendations regarding transparency go some way to
bringing the Community nearer its citizens and are responsive
to the idea of a People's Europe. The positive response given by
the Commission to the Report's penetrating analysis is wel-
come. It will now be up to the Commission to follow-up as it
indicated in its Communication. However, though much can be
done by the Commission in areas of Community competence,
the success of the follow-up to the Sutherland Report will de-
pend upon a positive response by the other Institutions, particu-
larly the Council and the Parliament, and the Member States.
What the Sutherland Report shows above all is that mere legis-
lation is not enough to achieve the success of the internal mar-
ket, but that a whole structure must be set in place so as to win
the confidence of the public, of consumers and economic opera-
tors. Implementation of the Report would go a long way to-
wards making the Single Market rules fairer, more transparent
and more efficient.
VIII. GROWTH, COMPETITIVENESS AND UNEMPLOYMENT
At the special summit in Brussels on 29 October 1993, the
European Council stated that 'a situation in which the Commu-
nity has 17 million unemployed workers and where a major por-
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tion of the population is cut off from the labour market on a
long-term basis, is intolerable and every effort must be under-
taken, as a matter of priority, to remedy that situation.' Calling
on the Council and the Commission to make concrete proposals
for the December summit, the Heads of State and Government
noted that 'our economies are now so closely dependent on each
other that we can only remedy the situation together.' It noted
that the proposals must relate to a medium-term strategy based
on the Commission's White Paper, which had been requested by
the Copenhagen summit, and on the broad economic-policy
guidelines of the Member States and the Community. It also
highlighted the role of the fourth research programme and that
of the Structural Funds and trans-European networks in that
connection.
The Commission's White Paper on "Growth, competitive-
ness and unemployment" notes that over the past three years,
unemployment in the Community has risen sharply and now
stands at 17 million people or 11 per cent of the work force.
This figure should be compared to the 1990 levels, which repre-
sented the lowest for a decade following five years of steady
growth and still had 12 million unemployed, or 8 per cent of the
work force. The White Paper states that the 'Community must
set itself the ambitious but realistic target of creating at least
15 million new jobs, thereby halving the level of unemployment
by the year 2000.'
The White Paper points to a number of factors which can
improve competitiveness: the opportunities offered by the single
market, the contribution to the development of regions benefit-
ing from programmes financed in the name of social and eco-
nomic cohesion, keeping pace with technological developments,
increased cooperation in the field of research and technological
development, an efficient network of transport and telecommu-
nications infrastructures both within the Community and to-
ward-central and Eastern European countries, and a conducive
world trading environment.
It suggests that there should be a gradual increase in the
relative share of research and technological development up to
3 per cent of GDP. It considers that low-cost efficient trans-Eu-
ropean networks in transport, energy, and advanced informa-
tion networks are essential for competitiveness and moreover
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their creation would ultimately create hundreds of thousands of
jobs. Essentially, the White Paper is suggesting a massive new
public works borrowing programme, costing some 20 billion Ecu
per year, financed by Commission borrowing on the interna-
tional capital markets, although in fact much of this sum was
already envisaged in the Delors II package, leaving only some 8
billion Ecu a year to be borrowed internationally. 400 billion
Ecu of direct public and private investment could be "mobilised"
by 1999.
The Commission White Paper also emphasised the 'employ-
ment environment,' referring to the importance of educational
priorities and of adapting and improving vocational training,
work-sharing and the reduction in working time, the promotion
of new job-creating activities and the importance of reducing
the costs of employment, in particular the arrangements for
taxing labour and calculating social security contributions
which can discourage employment, particularly of young people.
The White Paper notes that there must be a change of atti-
tude if the Community is to find suitable remedies for the
problems of employment and growth and is to enable its econ-
omy to adapt to a constantly changing economic environment.
It maintains that the measures designed to create jobs are in-
separable from those aimed at reviving growth and improving
international competitiveness. Loss in competitiveness leads to
loss in market share and hence to job losses. It stresses that the
search for competitiveness must not be to the detriment of the
Community's objectives of prosperity and social progress.
The target of creating at least 15 million new jobs would
halve the present rate of unemployment, based on an annual
rate of employment creation of about 2.5 per cent between 1995
and 2000. However, because the labour force in the Community
is expected to increase in this period, this figure will not be suf-
ficient, and to bring down unemployment, much more is needed:
a combination of higher growth but with an increased employ-
ment content. The White Paper thus looks to a growth rate of
at least 3 per cent a year from the mid-1990s, structural
changes as regards the competitiveness of Community industry
and changes in the employment environment.
The White Paper suggests a number of ways in which a sta-
ble macroeconomic framework could provide for stronger
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growth. It mentions a reduction of interest rates and of public
deficits, an increase in public saving, and wage and price stabil-
ity. A strategy to improve competitiveness must henceforth be
based on intangible aspects, including investing in human capi-
tal. Community industry should concentrate on those areas
where it possesses competitive advantages, i.e. high-value-ad-
ded products and services, as this would result in jobs being cre-
ated mainly in highly specialised areas in sectors exposed to
international competition.
The White Paper then identifies five issues as being essen-
tial to improve the working environment: education and train-
ing policies, improving the functioning of labour markets
including greater deregulation (thus greater employer freedom),
the possibility of work sharing and the reduction in average
working time, an active employment policy, promoting jobs to
meet new needs, and the reduction of labour costs. On the issue
of labour costs, it maintains that social contributions, which on
average account for more than 40 per cent of all labour costs on
the Community as compared to 20 per cent in Japan and 30 per
cent in the US, should be cut by between one and two points of
GDP in the medium-term. The cuts could be partially financed
by contributions of the newly-employed, savings in unemploy-
ment benefits resulting from lower unemployment (a case of
boot-strapping here) and from savings in public spending. Rev-
enue could also come from environmental taxes, taxation of in-
come from financial capital (both already the subject of
Commission proposals) and consumer taxes.
Initial reaction to the White Paper was mixed, particularly
as regards financing the package, including possible duplication
with the mission of the European Investment bank as regards
funding the trans-European networks. Others wondered
whether it was not just a job-creation scheme although
President Delors insisted that the trans-European networks
were a medium-term project for strengthening European
competitiveness.
At the Brussels summit of December 10-11, 1993, the Euro-
pean Council expressed support for the White Paper but it ap-
peared to stifle the plan's core, the borrowing programme to
finance the trans-European networks by referring to the EcoFin
Council the question of borrowing internationally the 8 billion
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Ecu necessary to arrive at the 20 billion Ecu budget for invest-
ment in the networks.
The figure of 15 million new jobs posited in the White Paper
was abandoned and instead the European Council speaks of 're-
versing the trend and then, by the end of the century, signifi-
cantly reducing the number of unemployed,' without pledging
specific goals. The Council also showed little enthusiasm for
making any concrete commitment to embark on the projects or
carry out other parts of the programme relating to job creation.
The conclusions of the Brussels summit stress the impor-
tance at national level of continuing education, flexibility within
enterprises and on the labour market, economically sound solu-
tions for the reorganisation of work (which must not aim at
generalised redistribution of work but towards internal adjust-
ments compatible with improved productivity), targeted reduc-
tions of indirect labour costs, notably as regards those on less
qualified work which could be compensated in other ways (tax
measures possibly relating inter alia to the environment are
mentioned), a stabilisation of statutory contributions and a re-
duction of the tax burden. There should also be measures to
help young people and information for job-seekers.
At Community level, the Council was broadly favourable to
the trans-European networks but with respect to funding, re-
ferred to the EcoFin Council as noted above. The research pro-
gramme is to be supported to the tune of 12 billion Ecu, with a
possible reserve of one billion Ecu being released later. There is
considerable emphasis placed on the importance of the social
dialogue. Finally, the Council provided for a monitoring proce-
dure to take place each year in December, to take stock of the
results of the action plan and to take any measures deemed nec-
essary to achieve the objectives set by the European Council.
The exercise will be carried out on the basis of reports from the
Commission (as regards job creation, the annual report on the
operation of the internal market and a statement on the pro-
gress of the trans-European networks in the spheres of trans-
port and energy and on the implementation of the operational
programme in the area of information infrastructures), the
Council (on the lessons to be drawn from national employment
policies, possibly accompanied by proposals for new guidelines)
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and the annual report from the EcoFin Council on the imple-
mentation of the broad economic-policy guidelines.
The conclusions of the European Council meeting in Corfu
on June 24-25, 1994 did not add anything concrete in terms of
supporting the plan, save as regards holding out hope for the
financing of trans-European networks.
It can be seen therefore that not all the Plan was accepted,
nor was it rejected in its entirety. Work on the White Paper is
to become an annual exercise, and it will, in the words of the
Conclusions of the Presidency at the Brussels summit, provide
"a reference point for future work." It is unfortunate that fi-
nancing of the trans-European networks dominated discus-
sions, and overshadowed the visionary part of the Delors
document concerning growth and competitiveness. These con-
nected issues should have been dealt with together with unem-
ployment. They remain on the agenda, whether the European
Council likes it or not. Moreover, apart from the networks, con-
crete action at national rather than Community level remained
the focus, despite the recognition of interdependence at the Oc-
tober special summit quoted above.
If the plan succeeds, even as modified by the European
Council, it will crown President Delors' contributions to the
Community, following the Single European Act and single mar-
ket programme, and the Treaty on European Union. The Com-
munity needs the plan to succeed if it is to remain competitive,
if it is to grow, and if the terrible social illness of unemployment
is not to grow and fester. Unemployment has more than eco-
nomic costs. As the Commission pointed out in the "reference
document" accompanying its Green paper on Social Policy, the
situation is now becoming socially dangerous. The cost of un-
employment is higher than the cost of unemployment benefits.
It has to be reckoned with in terms of poverty, ill-health, social
unrest, drugs, violence and social exclusion. Unemployment
wastes our greatest asset - our people.
IX. PREPARATION OF THE 1996 INTER-GOVERNMENTAL
CONFERENCE
The European Council meeting in Corfu on June 24-25,
1994 took a series of important decisions concerning the prepa-
[Vol. 7:1
52http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol7/iss1/1
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
ration of the 1996 Inter-governmental Conference. 13 4 It estab-
lished a Reflection Group to prepare for the Conference
consisting of representatives of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs
of the Member States and the President of the Commission. It
is to be chaired by a person appointed by the Spanish Govern-
ment and will begin its work in June 1995. Two European Par-
liament representatives will participate in the work of the
group, and there will also be exchanges of views with the other
institutions and organs of the Union.
The Reflection Group is to examine ideas for the revision of
the TEU and other possible improvements. It will also, in the
context of the enlargement of the Union, elaborate options on
the institutional questions set out in the Ioannina Agreement:
weighting of votes, the threshold for qualified majority deci-
sions, number of members of the Commission and any other
necessary measures. The Reflection Group will report to the
European Council at the end of 1995, when the Presidency of
the European Council will be held by Spain.'3 5
CONCLUSION
As the Union, and the internal market, becomes increas-
ingly attractive when seen from the outside, when seen from the
inside, by its own citizens, it seems costly, complex, remote and
with an unclear purpose. Whereas the 1992 process leading to
the creation of the single market is easily understood and an
almost universally shared aim, political union, described by
President Delors in the Delors II document as being "the main
objective of the European venture," is not. The end of the cold
war may also have changed the way in which Europeans view
the Community. Its political vocation no longer appears so nec-
essary to some. Moreover, events such as the lack of consensus
between the Member States during the Gulf war are identified
134 AGENCE EUROPE, No. 6260, June 26, 1994, 15.
135 The presidency rotates in turn between all the Member States for a term of
six months. In the crucial period between the time of writing and the 1996 IGC, an
unusually strong sequence of Member States, will hold the Presidency: Germany
(second half, 1994), France (first half, 1995) and Spain (second half, 1995), Italy
(first semester, 1996) and Ireland (second semester, 1996). It should be noted Arti-
cle N TEU imposes an obligation to convene the conference in 1996, but there is no
obligation to conclude the IGC in that year.
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as demonstrating the impossibility of European cooperation in
the fields of foreign policy and defence.
If these comments are an accurate reflection of part, at
least, of prevailing sentiment (which as noted above may
change quite rapidly) it is easy to understand why the TEU fails
to inspire consensus or enthusiasm, and why other plans to cure
the Union's economic ills are likely to face opposition. The TEU
is both too technical as regards monetary union, and too tenta-
tive as regards political union. Other plans to revivify the Com-
munity such as the Delors White Paper rely on a support for the
twin concepts of European integration and solidarity which sim-
ply may not be there in the changed climate referred to above.
Moreover, proposed in recessionary times, it is an extremely
costly programme.
However, although the TEU is imperfect, nevertheless, like
the SEA, it is a concrete and important step forward. What is
needed now is political leadership which can show the value
and necessity of political integration even after the single mar-
ket has been achieved. A mere act of faith will not be enough.
What is also needed is patience. Events have moved so quickly,
and the Community has been so successful that we tend to for-
get how far we have come in the last decade, since the White
Paper on the completion of the single market and the SEA. As
President Delors remarked in the Delors II document, "we are
on the way to pulling off the gamble." When meeting its rendez-
vous with itself in 1996, the Union should not forget that.
Closer European integration is an increasingly complex
goal, particularly bearing in mind the difficult challenge of in-
corporating the economies of Central and Eastern Europe into
the Union. The 1996 conference will bring the Union into the
next century. It must find an acceptable balance between those
countries like the United Kingdom, Denmark and perhaps It-
aly, who would like to see the pace of integration slowed down,
and others who wish to see it increased. The decision-making
procedure must be improved: the achievement of European in-
tegration should not be subject to uncertain compromises such
as that contained in the Ioannina Compromise. A resolution of
the institutional issues raised by enlargement, which will be the
subject of study by the Reflection Group, is essential. The ideal
of a united Europe will take time to realise, but it is one worth
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pursuing. The Union is based upon a respect for the rule of law,
a tradition of democracy, and respect for fundamental human
rights. These values must not be lost in the struggle to meet
the challenges of the future.
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